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OPERATION REPORT  
31 INFANTRY DIVISION

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
THE CAPTURE OF  
ANGAUR ISLAND

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO:

**CANCELLED**

AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

L. J. Zirklema R6D  
RADING COMMITTEE 27 Aug 78



## INTRODUCTION

Operations of the 81st Infantry "Wildcat" Division (Reinforced) in the Stalemate II operations in the Western Carolines have been divided into three general phases for the purpose of recording results, as follows:

- Phase I - Capture of Angaur
- Phase II - Operations on Peleliu
- Phase III - Seizure of Ulithi and other Islands

This report covers Phase I, the amphibious operation of landing on Angaur Island, Palau Group, Western Carolines, and the seizure, occupation, and initial development of that island.

The following is a chronology of principal events in the history of these operations:

### Phase I - Capture of Angaur

11 June	- 8 July	Division troops arrive in Oahu during period.
	6 July	Division Headquarters established in Oahu.
6 July	- 6 Aug	Planning and loading phase for Stalemate II.
6 Aug	- 12 Aug	Division enroute for Guadalcanal.
25 Aug	- 8 Sept	At Guadalcanal Rehearsal Area.
8 Sept	- 15 Sept	Enroute for Palau's.
0830	- 17 Sept	Landing on Angaur with Division less RCT 323.
1034	- 20 Sept	Island declared secure.
	20 Sept	Airbase development begun.
	21 Sept	RCT 323 departs for Ulithi operation.
	22 Sept	RCT 321 embarks for Peleliu, attached to 1st Marine Division.
	24 Sept	Unloading of cargoes of assault shipping completed.
	1 Oct	Ceremony symbolizing acquisition of Angaur for Government of the United States of America.
	14 Oct	Assault phase of operation declared complete and administration and development of base turned over by Angaur Landing Force Commander (CG 81st Infantry Division) to Island Commander Angaur.
	22 Oct	RCT 322 completed defeat of Japanese defense force when last cave area was entered, and cleared of the enemy, including the senior commander, Major Goto.

Phase II - Operations of Peleliu

23 Sept RCT 321 arrived on Peleliu, attached to 1st Marine Division

23 Sept - 29 Sept RCT 321 advanced along west coast of Peleliu and seized high ground in center of island.

29 Sept - 30 Sept RCT 321 relieved 5th Marines on Ngesebus and Kongauru Islands.

9 Oct RCT 321 seized Garakayo Island.

14 Oct - 15 Oct RCT 321 reinforced by 1st Bn 323 Inf began offensive action to destroy large enemy force in hill mass in south center of island.

20 Oct Commanding General 81st Inf Div assumes command of all combat troops on Peleliu and Angaur, relieving Hq III PhibCorps and Hq 1st Marine Division.

26 Oct RCT 323 returned from Ulithi and relieved RCT 321 (less 3rd Bn) in combat area on Peleliu.

11 Nov 81st Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop (Reinforced) seized Gorokottan Island.

15 Nov 81st Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop (Reinforced) seized Ngeregong Island.

27 Nov RCT 323, reinforced by 3d Bn 321st Inf, completed defeat of Japanese defense force on Peleliu when last cave area was entered and cleared of the enemy including the two senior officers, Major General Murai, and Colonel Nakagawa.

Phase III - The Seizure of Ulithi and Other Islands

21 Sept RCT 323 departs from Palau area under naval task group command. RCT conducts reconnaissance of Ulithi Island.

23 Sept RCT 323 occupies Ulithi Atoll.

15 Oct - 16 Oct Elements of RCT 323 seize Ngulu Atoll.

18 Oct - 20 Oct RCT 323 enroute from Ulithi to Peleliu.

4 Nov Reconnaissance made of Pulo Anna Island

20 Nov Det 52 Engr (C) Bn (Reinf) occupies Pulo Anna.

30 Nov - 1 Dec 81st Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop (Reinf) seizes Kayangel Atoll.

\* \* \* \* \*

### Summary of Angaur Operation

The 81st Infantry Division had been organized for two years and three months before landing on Angaur Island. During this period it had participated in extensive maneuvers in Alabama and Tennessee and in the California and Arizona deserts. Its amphibious training under the Amphibious Training Command, Pacific Fleet, in California, was thorough and complete. After the rehearsals of the landing in Oahu and in Guadalcanal, all personnel of the Division was adequately familiar with the amphibious requirements of the problem.

In preparation for the Stalemate II operation considerable assistance was given the Division in Oahu by Headquarters XXIV Corps, Major General John R. Hodge, particularly in planning its supply. For a brief period in Oahu the Division was a part of the command of the Xray Amphibious Corps, Major General Julian R. Smith. Upon arrival in Guadalcanal the Division passed to corps control of the III Amphibious Corps, Major General Roy Geiger, under which it operated until 20 October 1944. While afloat the Division was under Naval control of the Angaur Attack Force, Rear Admiral W. H. P. Blandy.

The assault landing was favored by a relatively calm sea and weak initial resistance by the enemy. Consequently the troops and assault equipment and supplies were landed with precision approaching that of a training exercise. The enemy resistance was not serious because he concentrated his main strength in the vicinity of beaches in the opposite end of the island. He had relied considerably on the narrowness of the beaches which we used for our landing and on the naturally difficult features of the terrain for the defense of the north part of the island. These conditions were disadvantageous to the assault battalions but their initial beachheads were secured promptly and though jungle growth over the rough broken coral formation handicapped the advance inland, progress was made about as had been anticipated. Valuable assistance was rendered to the infantry by bulldozers of the combat engineers. These machines were operated close behind the forward lines to enable supplies, particularly ammunition and water, to be furnished as required, and to permit rapid evacuation of the wounded.

The Naval Force Commander required that the landing of supplies and equipment be rushed so that the transports could

be dispatched early on another mission. Consequently unloading of cargo was placed on a twenty-four hour basis. This, together with the development of unfavorable surf conditions, and the difficult physical features of the beach and the supply dump area, resulted in less orderly handling of supplies during this period than was desirable. The shore and beach units labored indefatigably and their accomplishments under these conditions were most creditable. In seven days all troops in assault shipping, approximately 21,000 troops, and the cargo of 15 transports, 2 LSDs, and 13 LSTs had been unloaded and placed in dumps in an area that had been dense jungle a few days before.

The original plan of the ground maneuver envisaged early seizure of the high ground in the northwest part of Angaur. This idea was abandoned when reconnaissance indicated that the terrain was much rougher than conceived during the planning and that the area could not be taken readily. The southern part of the island was quickly overrun and the enemy remaining was isolated in two areas that could be reduced deliberately without interfering with the development of the island as an air base.

Angaur Island was declared secure after the enemy had been driven into these areas. This was recorded in a message sent to higher headquarters at 1034, 20 September. The enemy force remaining in the pill box system covering the Green Beaches was practically cleared out by RCT 321 by 21 September. This regimental combat team was released to the First Marine Division on this date and on 22 September landed on Peleliu. Its operations are covered as part of Phase II of the operations of the 81st Infantry Division.

The Garrison Force Commander with elements of his staff went ashore with Division troops, and on 20 September, the fourth day after the landing, had completed the initial reconnaissance for the airfield with results more favorable than had been anticipated. The engineer units which were to construct this installation were landed early and work was begun and carried through without interference from the enemy. The road communication plan for supply during combat conformed generally with the roads of the base development plan, and as a result the engineers of the Division practically completed the island road net within two weeks after the initial landing.

The 322nd Infantry remained to complete final destruction of the enemy in the natural defensive area in the northwest tip of Angaur Island. The Japanese defense force commander had retreated to this area with a large part of his original force. The strong works on Palomas (Lighthouse) Hill were reduced by the 322nd Infantry as the

first step in the clean-up. Numerous artillery pieces, nearly all emplaced to deliver fire on the southern half of the island, were captured. Many large caves containing personnel and supplies were destroyed in hand-to-hand action. The enemy, having the advantage of concealment in the rough terrain and of the security available in the hundreds of natural and artificial caves, was able to contest strongly the seizure of the area. North of the lighthouse was a bowl-shaped area with high ridges surrounding a lake near the center. These ridges were honeycombed with caves from which mutually supporting fires were delivered on our troops as they attacked in the area. Only one entrance, a narrow defile, was available for vehicles to move into the bowl.


The enemy was determined to hold to the end and to exact the highest possible toll from our troops. No general "banzai" suicide march was attempted. Enemy resistance remained under centralized control and was well organized practically to the end. His defense included carefully concealed snipers who held camouflaged positions on the coral pinnacles, in the jungle growth, and in small caves, from which they fired with deadly accuracy at close range. The location of the source of the fire could not be determined readily as the flash was invisible and the snipers well concealed. We fired large quantities of artillery and mortar shells, airplane bombs and napalm, into the area, and by these efforts the enemy's numbers were gradually reduced. Tanks were moved through the defile toward the center of the bowl. They rendered some assistance to the infantry, but the terrain was generally too rough for tank action. Bulldozers of the engineers, aided by demolitions, cleared trails forward to the front lines through heavy coral rock formations. Gradually the combat infantrymen, by steady pressure, clearing the defensive works and caves as he progressed, by the use of small-arms fire, mortars, grenades, rockets, explosives, and flame throwers, seized and held the bowl area.

The enemy's surviving force was now compressed into a smaller area of the roughest terrain on the island. Here was a mass of pinnacles of varying heights and crazy pattern, with vertical walls forming deep crevices, all composed of jagged coral rock with an occasional tree trunk still standing, and debris cluttering up the whole. In the crevices were caves whose entrances could not be effectively reduced by fire of any type except at grenade throwing range. These caves furnished a relatively safe retreat for the enemy and he

protected these caves by hidden machine gunners and riflemen on the peaks covering all routes of approach to the area.

The undaunted Combat Infantrymen of the Wildcat Division, matching their cunning with that of a desperate foe, day by day cut down the enemy's numbers, until finally on 22 October 1944, the vise closed as the leading elements of the battalions of the 322nd Infantry met in crevices which were the last headquarters of the Angaur defenders. The Japanese Major, commanding, had been killed two days previously by our riflemen. The remainder of his force was killed or surrendered. Thus Angaur Island was cleared of the Japanese.

The final chapter of the conquest of Angaur Island was written on 25 November 1944 when the 81st Infantry Division Cemetery and the Division Memorial Chapel were dedicated in the presence of more than 4000 of the troops who had participated in the operation.



PAUL J. MUELLER,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Commanding.


PHASE  
1

THE CAPTURE OF  
ANGAUR ISLAND

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PREPARATION  
FOR THE  
CAPTURE OF  
ANGAUR ISLAND



SECTION I - PLANNING PHASE

A - PRELIMINARY

1. Upon arrival of the 81st Infantry Division at Oahu, T. H., it was attached to the XXIV Corps (\*), in view of the contemplated employment of the Division as Corps Reserve for Stalemate I. Preparation for this operation was initiated by the forward echelon of Division Headquarters which arrived at Oahu the early part of June 1944. These included:
  - a. A study of the plan for Stalemate I.
  - b. Plans for the type and amount of equipment to be taken.
  - c. Tentative plans for the loading of LSTs.
  - d. Palletization of all classes of supply.
2. On 6 July the Division Commander arrived in Oahu and established Division Headquarters at Schofield Barracks, and on the following day he was orally informed by the Commander of Task Force 31 that Stalemate II was to be substituted for Stalemate I with the target date 15 September 1944. This was confirmed in writing on 12 July in a communication from XXIV Corps (\*\*). Tentative plans called for the Division to be embarked by 12 August.
3. The original concept of the Stalemate II Operation envisioned the employment of the 81st Infantry Division as follows:
  - a. Phase I: Operations by the Provisional Amphibious Corps in which the 1st Marine Division was to capture Peleliu and one RCT of the 81st Infantry Division was to capture Angaur, with the remainder of the Division in floating reserve for the Corps.
  - b. Phase II: Operations by the XXIV Army Corps in which the Corps was to capture the Yap Island Group and one RCT of the 81st Infantry Division was to capture Ulithi, with the remainder of the Division in floating reserve for the Corps. The use of the entire Division in Phase II was predicated on the assumption that operations in Phase I had been completed. In event they were not complete, only those elements of the Division not required in the Peleliu-Angaur area would constitute the floating reserve for the Corps. In the latter case, at least one RCT of the 81st Infantry Division was expected to be used for independent action against Ulithi under Navy control.

(\*) FO 214, Hq USAFICPA, 17 June 1944.

(\*\*) Top Secret Ltr, XXIV Corps, 12 July 1944, Serial 000211.

c. Following the successful conclusion of the Stalemate II Operation, it was planned to eventually dispose of the Division as follows:

Ulithi	- 1 Inf Bn
Peleliu	- 1 RCT, less 1 BCT
Angaur	- 1 BCT
Yap	- 81st Inf Div, less units designated above.

4. In accordance with the above provisions, it was tentatively planned to employ RCT 322 in the attack on Angaur and RCT 321 in the attack on Ulithi.

5. The XXIV Corps informed the Division that the tactical and logistical planning for Stalemate II was to be made under the supervision of the Commanding General, Provisional Amphibious Corps who was also Commander Task Force 36, Expeditionary Troops.

6. On 19 July the Division was detached from XXIV Corps and released for operational control to Commander Task Force 36 (\*).

7. At the beginning of the planning phase for the capture of Angaur only meager information of the terrain and the enemy was available. A thorough study of the photographs taken during the 31 March carrier strike against the Palau Islands revealed the suitability of certain beaches for an amphibious assault landing. Defenses were assumed to be located where they could best oppose a landing. With this as a basis, several tactical plans were considered which provided for a simultaneous landing on two beaches. In this respect, the plans conformed closely with those finally adopted for the actual assault on Angaur. The preferred plan involved a landing on Beaches Red and Blue to seize the northern half of the island initially; the alternate to land on Beaches Green III and II to seize the southern half of the island initially. As additional information became available, the feasibility of the preferred plan became more and more apparent, since the main Japanese defenses were being constructed to oppose a landing on the southern beaches of the island. The plans were approved in principle by Ground and Naval Commanders concerned and they formed the basis upon which further tactical and logistical planning was conducted.

#### B - FINAL PLANS

1. On 22 July the Division received important information relative to the strength of the garrison force on Angaur. Documents captured on Saipan indicated that the island was defended by a reinforced regiment, less possibly one battalion, instead of 300 troops as estimated originally. As a result the Division Commander revised

(\*): FO 236, Hq USAFICPA, 19 July 1944.

his plans to provide for a simultaneous landing by two regimental combat teams, supported by the remaining elements of the Division. On 26 July he submitted a plan and two alternative plans to the Commanding General, Provisional Amphibious Corps, for consideration. Plan 1, the recommended plan, and Plan 2, the first alternative, were similar to plans made previously for a landing by one RCT, insofar as the beaches selected for the assault landing remained the same. Plan 3 provided for the landing of two RCTs on three beaches. Details of the plans were as follows:

Plan 1:

- a. Assault landing with two regimental combat teams abreast on Beaches Red (RCT 322) and Blue (RCT 321); one RCT (323) in Division Reserve afloat.
- b. Leading battalions to land in LVTs; subsequent echelons to land by most expeditious means available until entire RCTs are ashore.
- c. Naval gunfire and airplane bombing and strafing of maximum intensity and duration, to be provided according to latest doctrines. Artillery preparation fires by 155mm gun units from positions ashore on Peleliu to be provided if at all possible. Special attention of all supporting fires to be given to shoulders on end of each beach and beach line immediately prior to landing, and probable assembly areas of mobile reserves near beaches immediately after landing waves have landed.
- d. Plan of maneuver ashore as shown in Map A.

Plan 2:

- a. Assault landing with two RCTs abreast on Beaches Green III (RCT 322) and II (RCT 321); one RCT (323) in Division Reserve afloat.
- b. Other elements of the plan as per Plan 1.
- c. Plan of maneuver as shown in Map B.

Plan 3:

- a. Assault landings with two RCTs abreast on Beaches Blue (RCT 322) and Green III and II (RCT 321). One RCT (323) in Division Reserve afloat.
- b. Plan to be used only in event of availability of an increased number of LVTs sufficient for landing three BLTs instead of two for which such craft were then available.
- c. Other elements of the plan as per Plan 1.
- d. Plan of maneuver ashore as shown in Map C.

2. All plans were to include a demonstration on a beach not utilized for actual landings in order to reduce the strength of the counterattacking forces anticipated during the early local phase of the operation.

3. It was recommended that priority be given the plans in the order proposed and that further planning be based thereon.

4. On 28 July the three plans were presented by the Division Commander at a conference attended by Commanders Joint Expeditionary Force, Expeditionary Troops, Angaur Attack Force, and 81st Infantry Division. The decisions reached were that Plans 1 and 2 would be designated the Preferred and Alternate Plans respectively, and that Plan 3 would not be further considered; that the strength of the force to be employed in either of the two accepted plans would be the Division less one RCT, the latter to be designated Reserve for the 1st Marine Division.

5. The revised estimate of the enemy strength on Angaur and Peleliu raised the possibility that all of the 81st Infantry Division would not be available for employment in Phase II. In such event, it was expected that one RCT would be used for independent action against Ulithi under Navy control according to the original concept of Stalemate II. On 1 August instructions from XXIV Corps (\*) directed the Division to develop the detailed plans for the Ulithi operation in conjunction with Commander Angaur Attack Force, without further reference to XXIV Corps.

6. A change in the operational control for Phase I occurred on 17 August as the III PhibCorps replaced the Provisional Amphibious Corps (\*\*).

7. On 22 August the 81st Infantry Division was relieved of participation in Phase II and the Ulithi operation, and its place taken by the 77th Infantry Division (\*\*). This plan called for the prompt unloading on Angaur Island of the entire Division and all its supplies.


8. On 26 August the Division was advised that RCT 323 was to be Corps Reserve instead of reserve for the 1st Marine Division. A request made for the release of the 906 FA Bn from RCT 323 to reinforce the 81st Division Artillery was granted, but the designation of a BLT of RCT 323 as Division Reserve was not favorably considered.

9. A further development in the Stalemate II Plan occurred on 16 September when the Division was advised that RCT 323, then in Corps reserve and afloat, was designated the landing force to capture Ulithi under Navy control.

(\*) Top Secret Ltr, Hq XXIV Corps, 1 August 1944, Serial 000294.

(\*\*) Errata No. 2, Operation Plan 1-44, Hq TF 36, 17 August 1944.

(\*\*\*) Errata No. 3, Operation Plan 1-44, Hq TF 36, 22 August 1944.



MAP A  
PLAN I (PREFERRED)  
26 JULY 1944

MONMOUTH  
HILL

REACH  
RFD

RCG

MONMOUTH  
TOWN

521 = 372

MONMOUTH  
VILLAGE

521 = 322

BEACH GREEN  
RCT THREE  
322


RCT  
321

BEACH GREEN FWD

N


MAP B

PLAN 2 (FIRST ALTERNATIVE)  
26 JULY 1944



C - TASK ORGANIZATION

1. The task force organized for Stalemate II was as follows :



2. The Angaur Landing Force consisted of the 81st Infantry Division (Reinforced), less RCT 323, organized into regimental combat teams and Division troops as follows:

a. RCT 321:

321 Inf  
316 FA Bn  
Co A 306 Engr (C) Bn plus Det H&S Co  
Co A plus Co D (less 2d Plat) and Hq 306 Med Bn (less det)  
Det 781 Ord Co  
Det Traf Sqd 81 MP Plat  
Det 81 QM Co  
154 Engr (C) Bn plus Det Hq and Hq Co 1138 Engr (C) Gp  
Det 592 JAS Co  
Det 481 Amph Truck Co  
Co A 726 Amph Tractor Bn plus Det H&S Co  
 $\frac{1}{2}$  Co D 776 Amph Tank Bn  
Co A 710 Tank Bn  
Det Prov QM Gr Reg Co  
Det Translator-Intpr Team A Hq Co CPA

b. RCT 322:

322 Inf  
317 FA Bn  
Co B 306 Engr (C) Bn plus Det H&S Co  
Co B 306 Med Bn  
Det 781 Ord (LM) Co  
Det Traf Sqd 81 MP Plat  
52 Engr (C) Bn plus Det Hq and Hq Co 1138 Engr (C) Gp  
Det 592 JAS Co  
Co B 710 Tank Bn  
Co D 88 Cml Wpn's Bn  
726 Amph Tractor Bn (less Co A and Det H&S Co)  
Co D 776 Amph Tank Bn (less  $\frac{1}{2}$  Co)  
Det 481 Amph Truck Co  
Det Translator-Intpr Team A Hq Co CPA  
17 Field Hosp (less 1 Plat)  
Det Prov Gr Reg Co

c. RCT 323:

323 Inf  
906 FA Bn (\*\*)  
Co C 306 Engr (C) Bn plus Det H&S Co  
Co C plus 2d Plat Co D and Det Hq 306 Med Bn

c. RCT 323 (Cont'd):

Det 781 Ord (LM) Co  
Det Traf Sqd 81 MP Plat  
Det 81 QM Co  
Det 481 Amph Truck Co  
Det 592 JAS Co  
155 Engr (C) Bn plus Det Hq & Hq Co 1138 Engr (C) Gp  
Det Prov Gr Reg Co  
Det Translator-Intpr Team A Hq Co CPA

d. Division Troops:

81 Div Hq  
Hq Sp Trs 81 Div  
Hq Co 81 Div  
81 CIC Det  
1 Photo Asgmt Unit 3116 Sig Sv Bn  
Translator-Intpr Team A Hq Co CPA (less 3 Dets)  
81 MP Plat (less 3 Dets)  
81 Div Band  
781 Ord (LM) Co (less 3 Dets)  
104 Bomb Disposal Sqd (\*)  
81 QM Co (less 2 Dets)  
2d Plat 3259 QM Serv Co (\*)  
3d Plat 247 QM Depot Co (\*)  
81 Sig Co  
481 Amph Truck Co (less 3 Dets)  
592 JAS Co (less 3 Dets)  
405 Ord Med Maint Co (\*)  
1st Plat Prov QM Gr Reg Co (less 3 Dets)  
81 Div Arty (less 3 light Bns)  
906 FA Bn (\*\*)  
81 Cav Rcn Tr  
306 Engr (C) Bn (less 3 Cos and Dets H&S Co)  
306 Med Bn (less 4 Cos and Hq Dets)  
41 Portable Surg Hosp  
Hq & Hq Co 1138 Engr (C) Gp (less Dets)  
290 Port Co (\*)  
3d Depot Plat 722 Engr Depot Co (\*)  
710 Tank Bn (less 2 Cos)  
483 AAA (AW) Bn  
7 AAA Bn (Marine) (-) (\*)

(\*) Garrison Force, Angaur.

(\*\*) Landed at Angaur 17 Sept; reembarked 19 Sept.

D - COMMAND AND STAFF

81st INFANTRY DIVISION

CG 81 Inf Div .....	Maj Gen Paul J. Mueller
CG 81 Div Arty .....	Brig Gen Rex W. Beasley
Asst Div Comdr .....	Brig Gen Marcus B. Bell
Chief of Staff .....	Col James C. Short
AC of S, G-1 .....	Lt Col John J. LaPage
AC of S, G-2 .....	Lt Col Paul D. Goddard
AC of S, G-3 .....	Lt Col William R. Woodward
AC of S, G-4 .....	Lt Col Langfitt B. Wilby
Adjutant General .....	Lt Col Wesley U. Moran
Ordnance Officer .....	Lt Col Cam Longley, Jr.
Quartermaster .....	Lt Col William D. Smith, Jr.
Chaplain .....	Lt Col Percy M. Hickcox
Chemical Officer .....	Lt Col Henry T. Galt
Inspector General .....	Lt Col George W. Gibson
Judge Advocate .....	Lt Col Hilary A. Bush
Signal Officer .....	Lt Col Leo V. Merle, Jr.
Surgeon .....	Lt Col F. Stanley Ewing
Provost Marshal .....	Maj Rowland McD. Ness

CO 321 Inf .....	Col Robert F. Dark
Ex O 321 Inf .....	Lt Col Paul Craig
CO 1st Bn (WIA on 23 Sept) .....	Lt Col Lester J. Evans
(18 - 20 Sept) .....	Maj William J. Porte
CO 2nd Bn .....	Lt Col Peter D. Clainos
CO 3rd Bn .....	Maj Dallas A. Pilliod

CO 322 Inf (WIA on 22 Sept) .....	Col Benjamin W. Venable
Ex O 322 Inf (CO 322 Inf since 22 Sept) .....	Lt Col Ernest H. Wilson
CO 1st Bn (Until 23 Sept) .....	Maj William R. White
(KIA on 17 Oct) .....	Maj Louis K. Harthrong
(Since 17 Oct) .....	Maj Michael Gussie
CO 2nd Bn .....	Lt Col Thomas D. McPhail
CO 3rd Bn (Ex O 322 Inf since 22 Sept) .....	Lt Col Leonard L. Cutshall
(Since 22 Sept) .....	Maj Manuel M. Schechet

CO 323 Inf .....	Col Arthur P. Watson
Ex O 323 Inf .....	Lt Col Robert E. Quackenbush
CO 1st Bn (KIA on 17 Nov) .....	Lt Col Raymond G. Gates
(17 - 30 Nov) .....	Maj Bart W. LaHatte
CO 2nd Bn .....	Lt Col Hugh J. Forsman
CO 3rd Bn .....	Lt Col Arthur W. Hutchinson

Ex O 81 Div Arty .....	Col James T. Loome
CO 316 FA Bn .....	Lt Col Carl Darnell, Jr.
CO 317 FA Bn .....	Lt Col Wilson M. Riley
CO 906 FA Bn .....	Lt Col John E. Barlow
CO 318 FA Bn .....	Maj Thomas J. McClane, Jr.

CO Sp Trs 81 Inf Div ..... Lt Col Newell E. Watts.  
CO 306 Engr (C) Bn ..... Lt Col Eskil M. J. Alenius  
CO 306 Med Bn ..... Lt Col Eugene F. Melaville

ATTACHED UNITS

CO 1138 Engr (C) Gp ..... Lt Col Charles R. Damon  
CO 52 Engr (C) Bn ..... Lt Col Harold Tabor  
CO 154 Engr (C) Bn ..... Lt Col Alan E. Gee  
CO 155 Engr (C) Bn ..... Lt Col John P. McWhorter  
CO 483 AAA (AW) Bn ..... Lt Col Arthur Roth  
CO 710 Tank Bn ..... Lt Col William M. Rodgers  
CO 726 Amph Tractor Bn ..... Lt Col Henry C. Switzer  
CO 17 Field Hosp ..... Lt Col Robert H. Bell  
CO 41 Port Surg Hosp ..... Maj David S. Ascher  
CO 592 JAS Co ..... Maj William S. Houston  
CO 481 Amph Truck Co ..... Capt Arthur W. Van Husen  
CO Co D 88 Cml Wpns Bn ..... Capt Edward L. Lockman, Jr.  
CO Co D 776 Amph Tank Bn ..... Capt Booth Thomas  
CO 1st Plat Prov QM Gr Reg Co ..... 2d Lt Stanley J. Lewis

SECTION II -- TRAINING PHASE

Approximately four weeks were available to the Division at Oahu for training and other preparations for the operation. Much of the training was a repetition of that previously given and was in the nature of a refresher course prior to battle. Training was conducted in the following:

- a. Jungle Training: An intensive six-day course conducted by HCPA. Practically all personnel in the Division attended and received instruction in how to live and fight in the jungle.
- b. Amphibious Training: Training was conducted by BLTs in transfer of troops from LCVPs to LVTs, use of DUKWs for artillery and LCMs for tracked vehicles. Each BLT participated in one exercise in which the technique of a BLT landing was stressed.
- c. Small Unit Problems: Rifle squads and platoons conducted problems to improve technique in small-unit exercises involving reconnaissance and combat patrols, mop-up, perimeter defense, and infantry-tank-artillery coordination.
- d. Weapons Training: Consisted of familiarization firing with as many individual weapons as possible, firing of Japanese weapons, service practice for all gun crews, and calibration firing for all new weapons.
- e. Special Training: Units conducted such of the following special training as was applicable to them in preparing for operations in densely wooded and swampy terrain: high angle fire, sound adjustment

of fire, fire on moving ground targets, sniper fire, sanitation and evacuation, prevention and treatment of diseases, care of materiel, transportation, laying and maintenance of field lines, road construction, and water purification.

f. Schools: Selected personnel attended schools for operation of all types of heavy engineer equipment.

### SECTION III - REHEARSALS

Rehearsals for the capture of Angaur were conducted at Maui, T. H., and Cape Esperance, Guadalcanal. The selection and designation of beaches and establishment of boundaries and phase lines were made to conform as closely as possible to those of the Preferred Plan for the operation.

#### A - MAUI REHEARSAL

1. First Exercise - 31 July: The entire day was devoted to debarkation drills without beach landings, formation of boat waves, and transfer of LCVP boat teams to LVTs.

2. Second Exercise - 1 August: RCT 323 landed with one BLT on Beach Red and another on Beach Blue. The third BLT of RCT 323 did not participate in the rehearsal due to lack of sufficient shipping. LVTs were employed to land assault and supporting troops, the latter transferring from LCVPs. Artillery was landed in DUKWs. RCT 323 (-) remained ashore to act as enemy force to oppose the final landings of the other two RCTs. The 81 Cav Rcn Tr was attached to RCT 323 for the landing and subsequent maneuver against RCTs 321 and 322.

3. Third Exercise - 2 August: RCTs 322 and 321 each landed with two BLTs abreast on Beaches Red and Blue respectively. BLTs landed in columns of companies. Troops advanced inland and then returned to the beaches for reembarkation. In this exercise all LVTs were made available to RCT 321, and transfer of supporting troops from LCVPs to LVTs was effected insofar as there was time to complete reembarkation of LVTs on LSTs prior to dark. RCT 322 landed in LCVPs. During the day, RCT 323 prepared to defend the beaches against the landings of RCTs 321 and 322 to take place in the following exercise.

4. Fourth Exercise - 3, 4 August: RCTs 321 and 322 landed as in the previous exercise, except that all LVTs were made available to RCT 322. Troops advanced inland to the O-1 line and prepared defenses for the night. The attack to the O-2 line continued the next day. Throughout this exercise RCT 323 harassed the remainder of the Division with counterattacks and infiltration.

## B - GUADALCANAL REHEARSAL

1. First Exercise - 30 August: RCTs 322 and 321 each landed with two BLTs abreast on Beaches Red and Blue respectively. Troops advanced to the O-1 line and established early contact between RCTs. On Division order RCTs advanced to the O-2 line. The Division Reserve (BLT 321-3) was landed on Beach Red and occupied an assembly area located approximately where it would be in the actual operation in event it were landed on Beach Red. RCT 323 (less one BLT and 906 FA Bn) was landed on Beach Blue as an additional part of Division Reserve and reembarked immediately. The 81 Cav Rcn Tr and advance echelon of Division Headquarters were landed on Beach Red. Artillery and tanks were not landed, although reconnaissance elements of the artillery and one LCT per LSD were moved to the beach and returned immediately for reembarkation. Naval gunfire and air support were in accordance with the plan for the operation, except that ammunition was not fired.

2. Second Exercise - 1 September: RCTs 322 and 321 were landed as in the previous exercise and followed the same plan of maneuver ashore. The Division Reserve (BLT 321-3) was landed on Beach Blue and occupied an assembly area located approximately where it would be in the actual operation in event it were landed on Beach Blue. The 316 FA Bn, in support of RCT 321, landed on Beach Red. The 906 FA Bn replaced the 317 FA Bn, which was unable to participate due to damage to its LST, and landed on Beach Blue in support of RCT 322. RCT 323 (less one BLT and 906 FA Bn) approached to within 300 yards of Beach Blue to simulate a landing and returned to transports; one BLT of RCT 323 did likewise off Beach Red. The 81 Cav Rcn Tr and Division Headquarters were landed on Beach Red. Naval gunfire and air support were actual and according to plan, except that preliminary naval gunfire was of two hours' duration instead of three. Fire support ships and direct support planes completed several call missions from ground troops. The unloading of equipment was limited to 10 vehicles, 6 medium tanks, 4 engineer DUKWs loaded with demolitions, and artillery DUKWs. Limiting the number of vehicles was necessary due to the difficulty in obtaining rewaterproofing materials.

3. Third Exercise - 3 September: This exercise involved a landing by RCT 323 (less 906 FA Bn) with two BLTs abreast on Beach Red. The landing was conducted in accordance with the Preferred Plan for RCT 322. Naval gunfire and air support were simulated.

#### SECTION IV - LOADING AND EMBARKATION

1. The 81st Infantry Division (Reinf) was embarked on 3 transport divisions and 13 LSTs. Based on the administrative orders of higher headquarters, the following supplies were loaded: 30 days rations; 5 units of fire for all weapons, except 105mm howitzers and 57mm guns for which there were 7 and 10 units respectively; 10 gallons of water per individual; and 20 days each of Classes II and III.

2. Two transport divisions were loaded at Honolulu and one at Pearl Harbor. The loading of cargo was done in two phases, as follows:

a. Phase 1: From 26-28 July, inclusive. Approximately 60% of the cargo was loaded at this time, before the ships departed for the Maui rehearsal exercises. Due to the fact that loading was taking place prior to the deadline date for procurement which Theater Headquarters had set for the island supply services, much difficulty was experienced in effecting the movement of supplies from the depots to the piers at the desired time.

b. Phase 2: From 6-12 August, inclusive. Ships returned from Maui on 5 August. The next two days were devoted to the readjustment of cargo to conform with the final plan of the operation. During the period 8-11 August the loading of cargo was completed. It was impossible to combat load entirely, inasmuch as issues of organizational equipment were received up to the day of departure from Oahu. Certain low priority equipment had to be loaded on top of high priority equipment, as there was no time for readjustment of loads. Troops were embarked on 10-11 August, and the Division departed from Oahu 12 August.

3. Troops of the first six waves, who were to assault the beach in LVTs, were all embarked at Oahu in their respective battalion APAs until the Division reached Guadalcanal. Upon completion of the Guadalcanal rehearsal exercises, 300 assault troops were transferred to each LST carrying LVTs. This number was the maximum that LSTs could carry. At the objective area, on Fox minus two, an additional 150 assault troops were transferred to LSTs to complete the LVT assault waves.

4. The loading of cargo was planned to provide for a balanced flow of combat supplies to the beaches. Ammunition, rations, and Class III were stowed by type in vertical blocks which were arranged radially around the hatch opening. This method made them available for simultaneous unloading. The plan worked very satisfactorily. In all but two cases necessary supplies were in the dumps ashore before troops had need of them. The exceptions were salt tablets and fuzes for 155mm howitzer ammunition. In future loadings, salt tablets will be loaded with medical supplies to insure early delivery of this important item.

5. The 41 Portable Surgical Hospital and 17 Field Hospital were embarked at Guadalcanal. Six vehicles were preloaded for them at Oahu; however, no definite information could be obtained concerning the total space requirements of these units. Upon arrival at Guadalcanal, it was found that their requirements had been underestimated by several thousand cubic feet. By rearranging loads of two ships most of their equipment was embarked. However, this was done at the sacrifice of some unloading priorities.

6. One of the greatest difficulties encountered in the entire loading process was the lack of information which unit commanders had relative to the amount of organizational equipment that was to be taken. The Division had arrived in the staging area with minimum essential equipment, as prescribed in Par 4k, POM. The requirements for this operation were far in excess of these minimum essentials. The lack of information as to what additional items could be taken prevented the preparation of accurate Cargo Manifest Sheets and Unit Personnel and Tonnage Tables. Many revisions were necessary which resulted in the loss of considerable time and effort.

7. In general, many of the difficulties encountered in the combat loading of equipment and supplies were eliminated when Phase II of the operation was cancelled. Complete unloading brought some low priority supplies into the beaches too early, but combat supplies were available when needed.

#### SECTION V - MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE AREA

1. The Division departed from Oahu in two echelons. The first consisting of ISTs leaving on 8 August; the second consisting of transports on 12 August. Transports arrived at Guadalcanal on 24 August; ISTs on 26 August.

2. The period at sea was devoted to work on the plans for the assault on Angaur, defense of the beachhead for the night of the first day, continuation of the attack on the second day, and defense of the island against amphibious counterattack. Plans were also prepared in conjunction with the Island Commander, who was aboard the USS Fremont with the Division Commander, for locating roads, bivouac areas, and installations. The problem of locating the entire Division on Angaur in addition to the airfield and garrison troops was difficult of solution in view of the limited acreage of the island.


3. Several command post exercises were held for the joint army and navy staffs. The situation assumed was based on the Preferred Plan as well as the Alternate Plans for the capture of Angaur Island and the Guadalcanal rehearsal exercises. These proved extremely valuable in giving each staff an understanding

### SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM

## ANGAUR ATTACK FORCE

RCT 321 - BEACH BLUE

RCT 322 - BEACH RED



of the other's problems. Procedures were developed which assisted materially in making the joint staffs function smoothly during the actual assault.

4. During the stay at Guadalcanal, several conferences were held with commanders and staffs of III PhibCorps and subordinate units in which all details of the tactical and logistical plans of the operation were reviewed.

5. Troops were landed at Guadalcanal for conditioning marches and recreation during the period when rehearsal exercises were not being conducted.

6. The first echelon departed from Guadalcanal on 4 September; the second on 8 September. Immediately after departure, troops were informed of the mission and plan of operation.

#### SECTION VI - ARRIVAL IN OBJECTIVE AREA

1. The Division arrived in the Palau area at 0515, 15 September east longitude time. During the period 0700-0900 additional assault troops were transferred to LSTs. Beginning at 1200 transports moved northward of the eastern shores of Palau Islands to vicinity of Namai Bay, Babelthuap for demonstration in connection with assault landing on Peleliu by 1st Marine Division. No landing craft were launched; but destroyers of the naval escort fired into the village and beach at Melekiok Pt. Transports continued to move within sight of the northern Palau Islands throughout daylight hours.

2. On 16 September the USS Fremont (F) cruised in the vicinity of Angaur and conducted close off-shore reconnaissance of the landing beaches. Battleships, cruisers, destroyers and naval planes subjected Angaur to a heavy bombardment throughout the day. At 1450 orders were received from Commander Angaur Attack Force to the effect that the Division would assault Angaur at 0830, 17 September, under provisions of the Preferred Plan.

#### SECTION VII AIR AND NAVAL GUNFIRE PREPARATION FOR LANDING (\*)

1. At 0530, 17 September 1944, fire support ships began a slow and deliberate bombardment of area targets well inland of the beaches. All parts of the island were subjected to these fires.

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(\*) For detailed report see Operational Features.

2. Naval gunfire was scheduled to lift during the period 0735-0750 to allow for air bombardment by fast carrier planes. However, planes were late in reporting on station, and at 0740 only 6 of an originally planned flight of 44 planes began their attack. In view of this delay, the Commander Angaur Attack Force ordered the continuation of low-angle naval gunfire during the remainder of the period scheduled for air attack. At 0748 a pre-landing strike was made by 16 VFs, 16 VBs, and 8 VTs. They were directed by CSA to bomb and strafe targets inland of the beaches to avoid interference with naval gunfire. Air bombardment ceased 10 minutes later than scheduled.

3. At 0804 intensive naval gunfire was directed on the landing beaches. This continued until 0822, at which time heavy caliber guns ceased fire in order to avoid interference with landing craft moving towards the shore. Fire from 5" and 6" guns shifted to the flanks of the beaches and the area between the beaches to a depth of 1500-2000 yards. These fires continued until 0830.

4. LCIs opened intensive fires on the beaches at 0815, employing 4.2" chemical mortars and 40mm and 20mm guns. They continued this fire during the approach to the beaches. LCIs added rocket fire to this barrage as they approached to within 1200-1000 yards of the shore. Mortar and rocket fire ceased on red flare signal to allow for strafing attack by CVE planes. Signal flares were fired off Beach Blue at 0825; off Beach Red at 0828. Fire from 20mm and 40mm guns continued against the flanks of the beaches until masked by friendly troops.

5. The pre-landing strafing attack was scheduled to begin when first waves were 1000 yards off shore, and to continue until first waves were landed. Twelve VFs strafed Beach Blue from 0825 until 0830; a similar number strafed Beach Red from 0828 until 0836.

6. Additional pre-landing air support was furnished by direct air support planes on station. Pilots were directed to attack targets of opportunity before returning to base. Three such attacks were made at 0740, 0748, and 0815 on pillboxes and machine gun positions.

7. Beginning at 0830 and continuing until 0900, 5" and 6" naval guns were fired along a general north-south line 1200-2000 yards inland to prevent the movement of enemy reserves into the areas of the landing beaches.

\* \* \* \* \*

17 SEPTEMBER 1944  
(FOX DAY)

The assault on Angaur began at 0530, 17 September 1944, as fire support ships and carrier planes subjected the island to a heavy bombardment. Under cover of this fire, troops began to debark from transports and LSTs; and by 0730, all organized waves of assault and supporting troops were boated. At 0750 the first waves of LVTs were at the lines of departure, 3000 yards offshore Beaches Red and Blue.


The approach to the beaches began at 0810. LCIs preceded the first waves by 300 yards, covering the movement with fire from 40mm and 20mm guns, mortars, and rocket guns. As LCIs approached to within 1000 yards of the shore, they moved to the flanks to allow the passage of LVTs through them. Strafing attacks by carrier planes protected troops during the last 1000 yards of approach to the beaches.

The first wave of LVTs of RCT 321 landed on Beach Blue at 0830, as scheduled. The first wave of LVTs of RCT 322 landed on Beach Red at 0836, six minutes behind schedule, the delay being due to a slight current running south off Beach Red. Enemy resistance to the landing on both beaches was limited to sporadic mortar and small-arms fire which were directed against LVTs approaching the beach.

The advance of troops inland from the beaches was slow due, in part, to the difficulties of the terrain. At 0845 the locations of advance elements on both fronts were approximately 50 yards inland. RCT 321 had been forced to cut its way through defensive wire and a wall just inland of Beach Blue to effect a penetration.

The favorable sea conditions in the early morning of Fox Day enabled landing craft to approach the beaches with comparative ease. The six waves of LVTs landed at the scheduled intervals. By 0900 all assault troops were discharged, with damage to only two LVTs on Beach Blue. Supporting troops were landed in LCVPs as rapidly as the capacity of each beach would permit.

Congestion on the beaches developed about 0915, due largely to the embankments immediately in rear of each beach which required bulldozers to develop roads leading off the beach. There was also considerable debris caused by the preparation fires which made passage of all types vehicles most difficult. The flow of traffic to Beach Red was further impeded by the failure of 3 LCVPs to retract promptly from the deep sand. On Beach Blue it became necessary to remove underwater obstacles to widen the water approach.



The transport division carrying RCT 323 made a demonstration off the western shore of the island shortly after 0830.

By 0900 the advance was progressing more rapidly. Some troops began to emerge from the dense jungle growth which lined the east coast of the island. In the RCT 322 zone of action, the most rapid progress was made in the direction of Cape Gallatin, an immediate objective of BLT 322-1. On the left, the progress of BLT 322-3 was impeded by heavy undergrowth, enemy mortar fire falling consistently into the area just south of Beach Red, and small arms fire from behind the ridge in TA 115 H,N. By 1000 the RCT had penetrated to an average depth of 200 yards.

Evidence of strengthening enemy resistance occurred in the zone of BLT 321-2. After advancing 150 yards inland, it was subjected to mortar and small arms fire from pillboxes in TA 111 B,P against which a strong air attack was directed. By 1000 the BLT had penetrated to a depth of 200 yards inland and 100 yards northward along the coast, demolishing several pillboxes in the course of the advance. On the left of the RCT 321 zone, movement by BLT 321-1 was impeded by enemy mines sown about 50 yards inland from Beach Blue and extending south. By 0940 the BLT advanced approximately 200 yards to the west and was reported 75 yards short of the O-1 line. Its progress along the coast south of Beach Blue was held up by fire from enemy pillboxes in TA 111 E, J and entrenchments in TA 107 I.

Co A, 710 Tank Bn, was landed on Beach Blue at 0944 and moved inland through a breach in the defensive wall and AT ditch guarding Beach Blue. At 0958 Co B, 710 Tank Bn, began landing on Beach Red and moved inland to join infantry troops.

At 0845 planes laid a smoke screen over the high ground in the northwest corner of the island to prevent enemy observation of friendly troops. The smoke screen was laid too high and proved ineffective.

At 0930 orders were issued to boat the infantry elements of the Division reserve (ELT 321-3) and for it to remain in the transport area until needed.

The expansion of the beachhead became rapid in the north, as BLT 322-1, advancing on Cape Gallatin, occupied it at 1120. Turning west, the BLT reached the O-1 line along the coast and prepared a temporary defensive position while awaiting orders to continue the advance to the O-2 line. On the left, BLT 322-3 continued to be harrassed by enemy mortar fire falling on the south edge of Beach Red and small arms fire from the ridge in TA 115 M,N. With the

SMOKE SCREEN  
BY FIRE  
SUPPORT SHIPS  
1020

PAIRO

85

MORTAR  
FIRE

## SNIPERS

## MORTAR FIRE

## MORTAR FIRE

elimination of the latter, tank-infantry teams moved rapidly to the southwest along the Pacific RR, creating a bulge approximately 150 yards beyond the O-1 line.

At Beach Blue the advance was slower, due to enemy mortar, machine gun, and sniper fire. Several pillboxes in TA 112 K, I, M were bypassed in an effort to effect an early junction with RCT 322 on the north. Mopping up was left to units in the rear. Fire from enemy pillboxes continued to be directed on our troops, and our air support bombed and strafed these enemy positions at 1137. Elements on the left of BLT 321-2 pushed on in the face of light resistance and occupied the O-1 line. Heavy mortar, machine gun, and sniper fire on the left flank of Beach Blue made it difficult for BLT 321-1 to advance to the south. Several enemy pillboxes remained active in spite of repeated rocket attacks by friendly planes.

At 1140 the command post of RCT 321 was established in TA 112 P, and CO RCT 321 assumed command of troops ashore.

Beginning at 1000 boat traffic toward both beaches was accelerated. At 1132 Beach Red was ready to receive remaining elements of the 710 Tank Bn. At 1137 Beach Blue was reported to be sufficiently clear to receive all supplies, except general cargo.

At 1020 fire support ships placed an effective smoke screen on the high ground in the northwest corner of the island.

At 1135 the reconnaissance party of the 906 FA Bn was ordered to Beach Red, with the remainder of the battalion to stand by until called for. At 1145 the Division Reserve BLT was ordered to land on Beach Blue, move to an assembly area in TA 112 G, establish communication with CO RCT 321, and await further orders from Division Headquarters. The BLT was further ordered to release its shore party to CO RCT 321.

Enemy resistance in the RCT 322 zone of action continued to be light. By 1400 BLT 322-1 completed occupation of the O-1 line without opposition. On the left, BLT 322-3 reached the O-1 line in the vicinity of TA 115 L and had patrols operating 800 yards to the west, without making contact with the enemy. Resistance continued on the south flank with mortar and sniper fire preventing an advance to the RCT boundary.

At 1230 the command post of RCT 322 was established in TA 116 C, and CO RCT 322 assumed command of troops ashore.

In the Beach Blue area, considerable resistance from enemy pillboxes and snipers continued to impede the advance of troops inland and to the flanks. At 1250 BLT 321-2 reduced pillboxes



in TA 110 O and 112 K,L,M which it had bypassed during the early advance. By 1400 the BLT had moved to within 350 yards of the RCT boundary on the north. On the left, BLT 321-1 reached the O-1 line in the vicinity of TA 111 X and sent patrols to the west and southwest. Heavy rifle and automatic fire prevented any appreciable gains on the south flank.

In view of the delay encountered by RCTs in establishing physical contact and the strong enemy resistance opposing BLT 321-2, CO RCT 322 was directed, at 1250, to push the attack vigorously on his left flank and gain contact with RCT 321.


At 1205 Co C, 710 Tank Bn, was ordered to land on Beach Red, move to an assembly area in vicinity of TA 115 N to await further orders, and establish liaison with RCT 322.

At 1415 CO RCT 322 was ordered to advance his right flank to the O-2 line, north of Aztec to the sea. BLT 322-1 advanced without opposition and by 1600 occupied the O-2 line and the ground approximately 300 yards beyond it along the north coast. BLT 322-3 advanced south and southwest in an effort to occupy the entire O-1 line within its zone of action and make contact with RCT 321; but progress was slow, due to the difficult terrain and sniper fire which continued to come from the wooded area in TA 116. At 1555 CO RCT 322 was ordered to advance his left flank to the O-2 line south of Aztéc, and to continue to make effort to establish contact with RCT 321.

In the RCT 321 zone, BLT 321-2 continued to move north in the face of heavy fire from a pillbox in TA 115 W4. All attempts to advance to the RCT boundary were unsuccessful. In the south, BLT 321-1 destroyed a blockhouse located in 107 E which was manned by 30 Japanese, and continued to assault another pillbox and entrenchments in the same area. At 1545 CO RCT 321 was ordered to advance as far as possible in the direction of the O-2 line, secure ground favorable for the night's defense, and make every effort to contact RCT 322.

At 1410 the 906 FA Bn was ordered to land on Beach Red and occupy previously reconnoitered firing positions in the general vicinity of Cape Gallatin. Orders were issued at 1600 for the 316 FA Bn to land on Beach Red and occupy firing positions in the vicinity of TA 115 M.

During the remaining hours of daylight of Fox Day, the movement of troops was based on the orders to reach ground favorable for the defense and as close as possible to the O-2 line. Along the north coast, the salient created by the advance of BLT 322-1 was withdrawn to shorten the front and troops dug in generally along the O-2 line.



On the left, BLT 322-3 continued to advance against enemy sniper fire, but failed to contact elements of RCT 321. In the center of the RCT 322 front, the salient pointing in the direction of Dateland was extended considerably as troops occupied favorable terrain about 200 yards short of the O-2 line.

In the RCT 321 zone, BLT 321-2 found it impossible to advance against the continued strong enemy resistance to its north flank. Troops in TA 111 I, N were withdrawn to defensive positions closer to the O-1 line. On the left flank, BLT 321-1 continued its slow advance with a flanking movement around enemy defensive positions located in the point of land in TA 107 E4.

Visual contact between patrols sent out by RCT 321 and RCT 322 was made at 1620 in the vicinity of TA 111 G2; physical contact, however, was not established.

Co C, 710 Tank Bn, in Division Reserve, landed on Beach Red at 1615, losing two tanks temporarily by drowning during transit from ship to shore.

By 1625 the 906 FA Bn had occupied positions in vicinity of TA 119 P and commenced registration firing.

At 1640 the Commanding General Division Artillery was directed to go ashore in order to coordinate artillery defensive fires for the night and artillery support for the resumption of the attack tentatively set for 0830, 18 September. He was further directed to coordinate defenses of 316 FA Bn and Co C, 710 Tank Bn.

At 1700 BLT 321-3 was released to CO RCT 321 for the purpose of strengthening the defenses of Beach Blue during the night; the BLT to revert to Division control at daylight 18 September.

During the hours of darkness, the 316 FA Bn and 906 FA Bn fired on all known and suspected enemy defensive positions and routes of approach to Beaches Red and Blue. Fire support ships covered the western half of the island with interdictory fires and illuminating flares.

At 2130 the following order was radioed to RCTs ashore: "FLEET AND FLEET AIR ARM CONTINUES TO SUPPORT THE DIVISION. DIVISION ATTACKS AT 180001 TO SEIZE O-4 LINE. LD PRESENT FRONT LINES. BOUNDARIES, NO CHANGE. 322 INF (CO C, 710 TANK BN ATTACHED) SEIZE O-4 LINE. 321 INF (LESS BLT 3) SEIZE O-2 LINE AND CLEAR REAR AREA IN ZONE OF ACTION. BLT 321-3 IN DIVISION RESERVE REMAINS PRESENT LOCATION. DIV ARTY WILL SUPPORT THE ATTACK AND DELIVER 3 HOUR PREPARATION BEGINNING 06001. END OF PREPARATION WILL BE INDICATED BY WP SMOKE SHELL."



Between 2300-2400 orders were issued for the landing of elements of Division Headquarters and 81 Cav Rcn Troop, beginning at 0630, 18 September.

Enemy activity during the night consisted of infiltration patrols on the south flank of RCT 321 and intermittent mortar fire in vicinity of Beach Red.

During the day the command radio net functioned perfectly. The Division Commander was in voice-radio contact with RCT Commanders at all times.

18 SEPTEMBER 1944  
(FOX Plus One Day)

At 0530 an enemy counterattack struck the south flank of BLT 321-1 in TA 107 I,J. Concentrated enemy mortar fire in TA 107 J2 caused forward elements of Co B to withdraw approximately 50 yards. Immediate response to request for strafing and rocket attack on enemy troops in TA 107 J aided materially in dissipating the threat of penetration into defensive positions. By 0745 the enemy began to withdraw and forward positions were reoccupied. The counterattack had caused considerable casualties, particularly in Co B, with the result that the company was withdrawn into RCT reserve and replaced by Co G. Enemy mortar fire which fell into the 1st Bn Hq area caused several casualties, including the wounding of the battalion commander and some of his staff.


At 0645 Co C, 306 Engr Bn was detached from RCT 323 and released to Division by III PhibCorps. At 0750 the company was ordered to land on Beach Red. At 0645 the Command Group, 306 Engr Bn, was directed to land on Beach Red.

At 0705 Co I of the Division Reserve Bn was released to CO RCT 321 as regimental reserve.

Boating of the advance elements of Division Headquarters commenced at 0705, and it was landed on Beach Red at 0755. 81 Cav Rcn Troop landed on Beach Red at 0755. Additional elements of Division Headquarters began boating at 0800.

From 0600-0900 a heavy artillery concentration was fired by the 316 and 906 FA Bns along the fronts of the 321 and 322 Inf in preparation for the attack. Scheduled naval gunfire and air bombardment were directed against enemy positions in TA 109 D,E,J and TA 110 F,S.

At 0900 the 322 Inf launched its attack to seize the O-4 line. On the north, the 2nd Bn passed through the 1st Bn, which was withdrawn into regimental reserve. The mission of the 2nd Bn was to outflank Romualdo Hill, then move south in order to make a junction.



with the 3rd Bn in the vicinity of the O-4 line. Progress was difficult due to the heavily wooded and broken terrain along the north coast which limited the rate of advance to a maximum of 150 yards per hour. On the left, infantry-tank teams of the 3rd Bn moved west to occupy the area in the vicinity of the Phosphate Plant.

In the 321 Inf zone the attack towards the O-2 line was delayed by enemy action. At 0905 an enemy counterattack struck the left flank of the 2nd Bn; and it was repulsed by 1000 with the aid of strong air attacks on enemy troops in TA 111 I, R, M, V. At 0935 a second counterattack struck the 1st Bn in the vicinity of Rocky Point, forcing a withdrawal of the extreme left flank near the shore to positions north of the Southern Railroad. All available direct air support planes on station were ordered to assist in repulsing the attack; and the area TA 107 H, J, I, C was saturated with bombs, rockets, and .50 caliber machine gun fire. An LCI standing off Beach Blue aided in repulsing the attack by taking Rocky Point under fire with its 40mm and 20mm guns. The 710 Tank Bn Prov Mortar Platoon fired a continual barrage until 1030, at which time the situation had become stabilized.


At 0942 the Division Advance CP was established in TA 115 O2 and communications established with major units ashore. The Commanding General landed on Beach Red at 0925.

Progress by the 2nd Bn on the north flank of the 322 Inf continued to be impeded by difficult terrain and heavy woods. By 1200 it had advanced 300 yards. On the south, the 3rd Bn received part of the attack by friendly planes between 1015 and 1038. The air strikes within our own lines were made as a result of erroneous designation of targets by ground elements which called for the support, together with other seemingly unavoidable circumstances incident to the combat.

At 1035 the 321st Inf began its advance to the O-2 line after repulsing counterattacks on both flanks. The 2nd Bn advanced along its entire front, making its main effort to the north and northwest, and succeeded in establishing physical contact with elements of the 322nd Inf on its right in TA 111 C, D, and E. Enemy snipers, well hidden in the heavily wooded area in TA 112 B, C and 116 W, continued to impede the progress of troops attempting to mop up in this area. On the left, the 1st Bn could not advance south along the coast due to extremely heavy enemy fire from pillboxes and dugouts in 107 I, J. The battalion moved 100 yards to the west and then south in an attempt to outflank enemy strong points along the coast.

At 1200 the Division CP opened at 115 O and closed aboard APA 44, and the Commanding General, 81st Infantry Division, officially advised the Naval Commander that he was in command of troops ashore, a formality called for by the plan of command.

18 SEPTEMBER 1944



Progress in the north sector of the 322 Inf zone continued to be slow as troops worked their way through the dense jungle growth. By 1500 they reached the O-3 line. On the left, infantry-tank teams of the 3rd Bn captured the ground in the vicinity of the Phosphate Plant and headed for the coast.

In the 321 Inf zone the 2nd Bn advanced west towards the O-2 line, maintaining contact with the 322nd Inf on the right. Enemy snipers remained active in the pocket in the vicinity of 116 W in spite of all efforts to search them out. On the left, continued enemy resistance from pillboxes in TA 107 I, J prevented southward movement by the 1st Bn along the coast. Enemy AT mines in 107 I slowed down infantry-tank teams attempting to outflank this resistance.

At 1257 a final group of Division Headquarters was ordered to land on Beach Red.

At 1330 two batteries of 318 FA Bn on APA 102 were ordered to land on Beach Red to occupy previously reconnoitered positions in the Cape Gallatin area, and the 317 FA Bn was ordered to land on Beach Blue to occupy positions in the vicinity of 112 C.

At 1425 the 81st Cav Rcn Troop was ordered to send a combat patrol to make a thorough reconnaissance of the area in the vicinity of TA 116 W and 112 C and destroy all enemy snipers in the area.

By 1330 one battery of the 155mm Gun Bn (Marine), emplaced on the southern tip of Peleliu, had conducted registration firing on Angaur.

After advancing to TA 117 R and encountering cliffs rising to 75 feet which effectively blocked movement to the south, the 2nd Bn, 322 Inf withdrew 300 yards to favorable defensive terrain for the night. On the left, the 3rd Bn mopped up the Phosphate Plant area and prepared the defense of the salient it had created in the direction of Saipan Town. Infantry-tank patrols reconnoitered to the edge of the town in the southwest in anticipation of the resumption of the attack the next day.

In the 321 Inf zone, the 2nd Bn advanced to within 100 yards of the O-2 line. On the left, the 1st Bn advanced 250 yards in its flanking move around enemy coastal defenses. At 1625 a pillbox in TA 108 A3, which had been partially destroyed in the first day's fighting, became active again. At 1655 the pillbox was completely destroyed and buried to prevent its reoccupation by enemy infiltration patrols.

DEEPEST  
PENETRATION

11 906

11 318 (-)

MORTAR  
FIRE

A 483

11 316

11 317

PATROLS

11 318 (-)

11 A 319

11 319 (-)

11 A 319 (-)

0-5

0-6

0-5

NAVAL and AIR  
BOMBARDMENT  
SOUTH OF THIS LINE

18-19 SEPTEMBER 1944

At 1532 orders were issued to the Division Reserve to remain in its present location for the night. At 1542 CO 321 Inf was advised that Co I of the Division Reserve was to remain attached to the 321 Inf for employment in the defense of the regimental sector.

By the combined action of the 81 Cav Rcn Troop combat patrol and mop-up details of the 2nd Bn, 321 Inf, the area in vicinity of TA 116 W and 112 E, C was cleared of enemy snipers and it was occupied by the 317 FA Bn.

At 1715 orders were issued for the continuation of the attack at 0730, 19 September.

Throughout the hours of darkness fire support ships illuminated the unoccupied part of the island and Division Artillery laid down heavy concentrations on all known enemy defenses and routes of approach for counterattack. The battery of 155mm guns emplaced on Peleliu fired on enemy defenses in TA 102.


A Red Air Alert was in effect from 1935 to 2205, but enemy planes failed to attack Angaur. Other enemy activity during the night consisted of infiltration patrols operating against both regiments and intermittent mortar fire in the vicinity of Beach Red.

Btry A, 483 AAA (AW) Bn landed on Beach Red at 2330 and occupied positions in TA 115J.

19 SEPTEMBER 1944  
(FOX Plus 2 Days)

From 0600 to 0700 fire support ships and planes bombarded the area south of the line TA 103 D - 105 J. Beginning at 0630 Division Artillery fired a one-hour preparation to precede the attack.

The attack was resumed at 0730. In the north, the 322 Inf advanced with three battalions abreast, the 2nd Bn on the right, the 1st Bn in the center, and the 3rd Bn on the left. The plan of the 322 Inf was for the 1st and 2nd Bns to advance to the southwest and seize all the ground north of the O-4 line, except Romauldo Hill which was to be mopped up by elements of the 2nd Bn after the completion of its primary mission. Further, the 2nd Bn was to defend along the north coast to prevent the withdrawal of the enemy eastward from Romauldo Hill. The 3rd Bn, supported by two companies of medium tanks 710 Tank Bn, was to advance directly through Saipan Town and occupy the area between the O-4 line and O-5 line.




By 0830 rapid progress was being made. At that hour the Division Commander conferred with commanders 321 Inf and 322 Inf at the Phosphate Plant and directed them to continue to advance beyond the O-5 and O-6 lines and to complete the seizure of the island within their respective zones.

In the 321 Inf zone, infantry-tank teams of the 2nd Bn made swift progress to seize Middle Village by 0900. Abandoned enemy defense installations within the area were destroyed to prevent their reoccupation by small enemy groups which were still active in the area. The battalion turned south and advanced 400 yards to reach the edge of the swamp in TA 106 M,N,O. Tanks on reconnaissance missions moved along the boundary between regiments and reconnoitered to within 200 yards of the south tip of the island. On the left, the 3rd Bn passed through the 1st Bn; the latter, less one company, reverting to Division Reserve. Combined infantry-tank action by the 3rd Bn eliminated three enemy pillboxes along the coast just south of Rocky Point. The battalion continued to advance in parallel columns, one along the coast and the other approximately 300 yards inland. Heavy fire from two enemy pillboxes in TA 107 L and caves in TA 107 Q pinned down troops advancing along the coast. The inland column reached the edge of the swamp in TA 106 O and turned east. Repeated attempts by both columns to converge on the pillboxes in TA 107 L were frustrated by heavy machine gun fire and extremely well controlled mortar fire which inflicted heavy casualties on friendly assault troops.

At 0745 the 81 Cav Rcn Troop was ordered to clear of the enemy all caves and holes along the coast, southward from Beach Red.

The capture of Saipan Town was completed as the 3rd Bn 322 Inf reached the O-6 line. Mopping up details were employed to search out individual Japs who continued to hide in holes and dugouts along the coast and in the ruins of buildings within the town. The 2nd Bn reinforced by Co B continued in its attempt to take Palomas Hill. Some troops succeeded in working their way up the rocky slopes, but progress was slow and costly. Elements of the 2nd Bn moved around the base of the hill in order to bypass it and move northward along the coast to reach Romauldo Hill by way of Beach Black. Other troops advanced through the railroad cut towards TA 113 Q, but were stopped by heavy enemy fire from numerous defensive positions around Salome Lake.

In view of the situation as it existed at 1230, the Division Reserve (1st Bn, 321 Inf) was released to CO 321 Inf and CO 322 Inf directed to constitute a regimental reserve. Pursuant to these instructions the 1st Bn 322 Inf reverted to regimental reserve and occupied an assembly area in the vicinity of the Phosphate Plant.



Progress by the 321 Inf continued to be impeded by heavy enemy resistance along Beach Green and the swampy terrain to the west of it. In order to move as rapidly as possible towards the southern tip of the island, the 2nd Bn on the right withdrew from the edge of the swamp in TA 106 M,N towards Middle Village, and then moved south on the firm ground along the boundary between regiments. On the east coast the 3rd Bn continued its efforts to reduce the defenses of Beach Green Three, and succeeded in destroying two caves at TA 107 Q. At 1500 the CO 321 Inf committed the 1st Bn in the gap between the 2nd and 3rd Bns and a general advance to the south began with three battalions abreast. The scheme of maneuver was to advance rapidly on the right to seize the southern tip of the island and reduce at the same time the strong enemy positions at Beach Green Three with a frontal advance by the 3rd Bn along the east and a flanking movement by the 1st Bn through the swamp.


At 1300 the 906 FA Bn was reembarked for employment in the Ulithi operation with RCT 323. At the same time, Btry C, 318 FA Bn was landed on Beach Red and joined the remainder of the battalion at Cape Gallatin.

All attempts of the 322 Inf to capture Palomas Hill and advance to Romauldo Hill were met by strong enemy resistance. In view of the impossibility of gaining positions favorable for the defense prior to darkness, the 2nd Bn was withdrawn to the vicinity of the Phosphate Plant. The 1st Bn moved to TA 115 where it occupied defensive positions in order to protect rear installations on Beach Red from possible enemy counterattack. The 3rd Bn established defensive positions in Saipan Town.

The 321 Inf advanced with three battalions abreast. The 2nd Bn, accompanied by tanks, advanced 800 yards and reached the north edge of a cocoanut grove in TA 102 where it was counterattacked at 1735 by an enemy force estimated at 200. The attack was repulsed with heavy losses to the Japanese. The 3rd Bn, moving along the coast, destroyed several enemy defensive installations guarding the northern edge of Beach Green Three, and continued to advance against many others concentrated within its zone. The 1st Bn moved through the swamp in TA 106 and into flanking positions about 600 yards to the west of the enemy beach defenses.

At 1730 unconfirmed reports indicated an enemy attempt to evacuate by rubber boats from the southern end of the island. Artillery concentrations were laid down along the water edge in TA 102 and TA 103 to frustrate any such attempt to escape.

At 1800 orders were issued for the continuation of the attack at 0730, 20 September.



At 1930 the three medium tank companies, 710 Tank Bn, less one medium tank platoon, were attached to the 321 Inf to assist in capturing the southern half of the island. The Division Artillery was directed to support the attack of the 321 Inf with call fires from all batteries.

A Red Air Alert Warning was in effect from 1855 to 1945, but enemy planes failed to attack Angaur Island. Other enemy activity during the night consisted of widespread infiltration by Japanese patrols. Considerable harrassing fire from enemy mortars located on Palomas Hill fell into the 2nd Bn, 322 Inf area. An expected enemy counterattack on the left flank of the 321 Inf failed to materialize.


Division Artillery fired approximately 500 rounds on enemy defensive installations in TA 102. Due to the proximity of troops to all objectives, naval gunfire was dispensed with except for illuminating shells which were fired over the southern and north-western parts of the island. LCIs kept the waters under surveillance throughout the night to prevent any attempt by the enemy to escape from the island.

Between midnight and 0200, Btries B and C, 483 AAA (AW) Bn were landed on Beach Red and occupied positions in TA 115 E.

20 SEPTEMBER 1944  
(FOX Plus 3 Days)

The 322 Inf attacked at 0730. The 2nd Bn, supported by the Cannon Co and one platoon of medium tanks, advanced to capture Palomas Hill. The enemy offered stubborn resistance from the many caves and the strongly fortified positions that covered the hill. At 0900 the battalion seized its objective and captured large stores of Japanese equipment and weapons, including several guns of 75mm caliber. None of the enemy surrendered. The 1st and 3rd Bns remained in the defensive positions which they had occupied during the previous night.

The attack of the 321 Inf was delayed pending the arrival of additional elements of the 710 Tank Bn which had been attached to it. The 2nd Bn, reinforced by two rifle companies of 1st Bn and two companies of tanks, began its advance to the south at 0805. It quickly over-ran numerous dugouts, pillboxes, and fire trenches, forcing disorganized elements of the enemy to flee to the southern tip of the island. In the vicinity of Beach Green, the 1st Bn, supported by one company of tanks, continued to force its way along the coast, meeting considerable resistance from many pillboxes.



defending the beach. Remaining elements of the 1st Bn advanced through the swamp and approached closer to the rear of the enemy defenses along Beach Green.


At 0700 Btry D, 483 AAA (AW) Bn landed on Beach Blue and occupied firing positions to the flanks of the beach.

After capturing Palomas Hill, the 2nd Bn, 322 Inf reorganized and began to advance in the direction of the high ground in TA 113. The extremely broken terrain and strong enemy resistance made movement most difficult. Track-laying vehicles could approach the objective only through a very narrow defile along the railroad track in TA 113 T. Two M-8s were disabled as they attempted to negotiate the defile in order to occupy firing positions in the open ground to the north, one suffering a direct hit from an enemy AT gun, the other striking a mine. In an effort to outflank the enemy position, Co B was ordered to advance to the high ground from an assembly area at TA 114 Q. At 1100 one platoon of medium tanks was detached from the 321 Inf and released to the 322 Inf to assist in the attack.

In the 321 Inf zone, the attack to clear the southern portion of the island progressed swiftly, overrunning pillboxes, dugouts, and fire trenches. At 1000 the few enemy troops who survived the attack were driven into TA 101 T and Co C was left to dispose of them. The 2nd Bn then turned north and moved in the direction of Beach Green Three to effect a junction with elements of the 1st Bn moving to flank enemy defenses from the rear. By this maneuver the enemy was completely encircled by an overwhelming force which continued to compress the area of resistance. At 1100 Co C completed mopping up in TA 101 T. The 3rd Bn, moving southward along the coast, made steady progress against determined resistance from pillboxes and caves.

With the seizure of the southern tip of the island, organized enemy resistance ceased to exist, and Angaur Island was reported secure by the Division Commander at 1034. Mopping up was to continue until the destruction of the enemy was complete.

The 2nd Bn, 322 Inf suffered heavy casualties as it advanced towards its objective. It succeeded in reaching the southern edge of Salome Lake, but further progress was impossible in the face of the heavy machine gun and rifle fire which came from caves cut into the high ground north of the lake. The enemy had fortified himself in positions which commanded the southern approach to the hill mass. Efforts to bring heavy caliber supporting weapons into position were nullified by the rocky terrain and crevices which permitted only movement by foot, and that with difficulty. The envelopment by



Co B was slow as troops were forced to cut trails through the dense jungle growth. At 1500 the battalion was withdrawn from its exposed forward positions to allow for artillery registration firing on the enemy stronghold during hours of daylight. It was planned to direct heavy preparations against the entire hill mass throughout the night and early morning. In preparation for this firing, Btry C, 318 FA Bn was moved from Cape Gallatin to firing positions in TA 112 in order to place targets beyond minimum range of the battery.

In the 321 Inf zone, continued action against the Beach Green defenses reduced resistance to occasional sniper fire. The 2nd Bn was removed from the line to an assembly area in TA 106 U and the task of containing the enemy was left to elements of the 1st and 3rd Bns. Mop-up patrols were active throughout the southern portion of the island searching for the enemy in all possible hiding places.

At 1600 a warning order for the defense of the island was issued, in which areas of responsibility were assigned to regiments. The 321 Inf was ordered to prepare the defense of the island south of the Southern Railroad and continue to mop-up until all Japanese were captured or destroyed. CO 322 Inf was given a similar mission for the northern half of the island.


At 1800 oral orders were issued to CO 322 Inf to defend for the night and continue the attack at 0800, 21 September to clear the northwestern area; the entire Division Artillery and Naval Air Arm to be in support of the attack.

A Red Air Alert was in effect from 1855 to 1940, but enemy planes failed to attack Angaur Island. Other enemy activity during the night consisted of infiltration patrols into the defensive area of 322 Inf. No activity occurred in the zone of the 321 Inf.

During the night artillery fired heavy concentrations of 105mm and 155mm shells into TA 113 and 117. LCI gunboats fired 40mm and 20mm guns into the same area. Other fire support ships covered the northwestern portion of the island with illuminating flares.

21 SEPTEMBER 1944  
(FOX Plus 4 Days)

An intensive artillery preparation to precede the attack of 322 Inf began at 0600 and lasted until 0700. For the next half hour naval planes attacked targets with 500 lb bombs, rockets, and



fire bombs. The artillery preparation was resumed at 0730 and continued until 0800.


The 322 Inf committed two battalions in the assault. The 2nd Bn, attacking from the south, sent one rifle company, reinforced with tanks, towards the defile in TA 113 T. In order to advance supporting tanks to the open ground near the south edge of Salome Lake, it was first necessary to remove from the defile the two M-8s disabled during the previous day's fighting. By 1200 tanks were able to advance beyond the cut and immediately took under fire enemy positions located in the numerous caves throughout area TA 113 O. Due to the difficulties of terrain, which was broken everywhere by high pinnacles and deep crevices, movement was confined to the narrow railroad line. Two tanks attempting to maneuver into firing positions just off the railroad line were overturned as their tracks fell into such crevices. One tank burst into flames as it overturned; the other was set on fire by a Japanese patrol during the night. Intense resistance continued in spite of the large number of enemy strongpoints destroyed by flame thrower and explosive. Two companies of the 2nd Bn advanced north along the coast in an attempt to outflank the high ground from the northwest. By 1400 they reached the northwest tip of the island, blasting numerous caves in the bluff which lines the coast. Attempts to advance inland were without result, as troops were confronted by pinnacles and deep crevices that formed an impenetrable barrier to the heights. Movement by the 1st Bn from TA 114 to Romauldo Hill was beset with similar difficulties of terrain and thick underbrush. Its advance during the entire day was limited to 200 yards, during which it met no enemy resistance.

Direct artillery support of the 322 Inf ceased as of 1030, due to the close proximity of friendly troops to enemy positions.

In the south, the 321 Inf eliminated a small pocket of resistance on Beach Green. The area was subdivided into battalion areas of responsibility in each of which a systematic mop-up was executed of all possible enemy hiding places.

At 1500 the 2nd Bn, 322 Inf began to withdraw to defensive positions for the night. The ground which they had occupied during the day's operations was untenable, exposed, as it was, to constant enemy observation and fire of all types.

At 1625 a dispatch from III PhibCorps requested information as to whether the 81st Infantry Division was in a position to furnish one combat team for immediate movement to Peleliu to assist the 1st Marine Division to complete seizure of the island. At 1705 the Commanding 81st Infantry Division advised Headquarters III PhibCorps that RCT 321



22 SEPTEMBER 1944

was available for the task immediately upon completion of its resupply, and RCT 321 was warned to make preparations for movement to Peleliu.

During the day RCT 323, in Corps Reserve, departed for Ulithi with the mission of seizing and occupying Ulithi Atoll.

The 7 AAA Marine Bn, part of the Garrison Force, landed on Beach Red at 1230 and occupied firing positions in the vicinity of Middle Village, the Phosphate Plant, and Beach Red.

Enemy activity during the night consisted of infiltration patrols into the 2nd Bn, 322 Inf area.

Throughout the hours of darkness, the Division Artillery fired extremely heavy concentrations into enemy defenses on Romauldo Hill.

At 2000 orders were issued directing the 322 Inf to relieve the 321 Inf of the defense of the southern half of the island, effective 0800, 22 September. Orders directing the loading and movement of RCT 321 to Peleliu were issued at 2300.

22 SEPTEMBER 1944  
(FOX Plus 5 Days)

At 0730 322 Inf continued its attempt to clear the enemy from Romauldo Hill. Two task forces were organized to advance generally in accordance with the plan of maneuver of the previous day. The 2nd Bn, reinforced by Co B, 710 Tank Bn and Co D, 88 Cml Wpns Bn made a frontal assault to destroy the enemy in his positions or drive him toward the sea. Two rifle companies advanced north along the coast to destroy all enemy attempting to escape before the assault of the 2nd Bn. Elements of the 1st Bn remained in positions occupied during the previous night to prevent the withdrawal of the enemy to the east. Every yard of advance by the 2nd Bn was contested by severe enemy resistance from caves and crevices whose locations were most difficult to detect. Heavy casualties were suffered, including the wounding of the Commanding Officer, 322 Inf, requiring his evacuation from the area. By midafternoon, the battalion had advanced to TA 113 N,O,I,J, a low area surrounded on three sides by high ground covered with jagged rocks, coral cones, pinnacles, and enemy snipers. The force advancing north along the coast encountered no resistance, but destroyed many caves to prevent their occupation by enemy troops.

Prior to darkness, troops were withdrawn into defensive positions north of the Phosphate Plant and plans made for the resumption of the attack at 0730, 23 September. One medium tank was destroyed in TA 113 T

CAPE GALLATIN

ARTILLERY  
FIRE

DEEPEST  
PENETRATION

I

E

C

HQ 322  
SV 322  
II 316

III 317  
C 318

3HQ   
D 710  
AT

M   
CN   
D 710  
AT (-)

I HGA   
D   
AT

IV 318 (-)

22-23 SEPTEMBER 1944

2

as a result of this action.

At 0800 the 322 Inf took over the defense of the entire island. Four defensive zones were established, each of which was garrisoned by a small defense task group. The northwest corner of the island remained a combat zone.

RCT 321, less the 316 FA Bn, commenced loading at Beach Red at 0700. Loading was completed at 1625 and the RCT departed for Peleliu.

Enemy activity during the night consisted of infiltration patrols.

Division Artillery fired harrassing and interdiction fires throughout the hours of darkness. Fire support ships continued to illuminate the entire northwest corner of the island.

23 SEPTEMBER 1944  
(FOX Plus 6 Days)


At 0730 two task groups of the 322 Inf again attempted to seize Romauldo Hill by advancing from the south. Three rifle companies, supported by tanks, moved to the east side of Salome Lake to make a frontal attack. Two rifle companies moved north along the ridges to the west of the lake in an attempt to envelop enemy positions in TA 117 W and X. Difficulties of terrain and strong enemy resistance again combined to make the advance slow and costly.

By late afternoon troops had progressed to the area just north of the lake. Many snipers hiding in caves and crevices were destroyed in a methodical mop-up of the area. By darkness forward elements were withdrawn to the south edge of the lake to permit artillery interdiction and harrassing fire during the night.

The two batteries of the 318 FA Bn at Cape Gallatin moved to the vicinity of TA 102 to occupy positions from which they could fire at Romauldo Hill. Registration firing was completed prior to dark.

24 SEPTEMBER 1944  
(FOX Plus 7 Days)

Throughout the morning of 24 September offensive combat was suspended during the delivery of a loud speaker broadcast to enemy



24-25 SEPTEMBER 1944

troops asking that they surrender. The attempt was fruitful only to the extent that two Japanese did surrender and volunteered useful information relative to the number of enemy left and the type of weapons being employed by them.

By noon the 316 FA Bn moved to positions in the vicinity of TA 102 C in preparation for the delivery of heavy fire on Romauldo Hill.

During the afternoon concentrations by three battalions of artillery were fired into enemy positions. Infantry troops were shifted in order to relieve the 2nd Bn 322 Inf. from the line and attempt an attack from a new direction the following morning. One rifle company of the 3rd Bn, supported by heavy weapons of the 2nd Bn, occupied a position in the vicinity of Salome Lake. The remainder of the battalion, reinforced by Co A, 1st Bn and Co B, 306 Engr Bn moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of TA 118 W, X from which it was to advance due west, cutting a road, if necessary, for supply and evacuation.

Enemy activity during the night was light. Four Japs were killed trying to infiltrate positions in the vicinity of Salome Lake.


Division Artillery fired interdiction and harrassing fire throughout the hours of darkness.

25 SEPTEMBER 1944  
(FOX Plus 8 Days)

At 0730 the 3rd Bn moved west from its assembly area. The advance was on a very narrow front adjacent to the coast, due to the extreme difficulty of the terrain inland. Troops had to cut their way through the dense jungle growth that extended to the water edge.

By midafternoon the battalion reached TA 117 Q, R without encountering the enemy. Jagged cliffs formed an impenetrable barrier to the south. Construction of a road was a slow process, and supply and evacuation had to be effected by water, employing LCVPs. Co I, at Salome Lake, attempted to draw the enemy's attention from the 3rd Bn's movement by feinting an attack on the enemy's positions from the south.

In order to make still another attempt to discover a route of approach to the enemy stronghold, the battalion was withdrawn to the



26 SEPTEMBER 1944

area from which it had departed that morning. In anticipation of a move to the southwest the following day, artillery liaison planes were employed to assist in searching out a route, if such existed.

Division Artillery fired interdiction and harrassing fires throughout the night into TA 113 and 117.

26 SEPTEMBER 1944  
(FOX Plus 9 Days)

The attack of the 322 Inf was resumed at 0730. The 3rd Bn moved southwest from TA 118 R and W. Infantry troops were closely followed by bulldozers cutting a trail through the heavy undergrowth and coral formations. The advance was slow and difficult but without enemy opposition. By noon the battalion was in position to break into the bowl in TA 113.



At 1200 an attack was launched to route the enemy from his fortified positions. Elements of all battalions began to move towards the bowl. The 3rd Bn advanced from the east; two companies of the 2nd Bn from the southeast; and Co B from Palomas Hill to a position on line with Co I. The enemy countered with heavy rifle and mortar fire, but troops succeeded in breaking into the bowl on all fronts. Defensive positions for the night were prepared on the ground occupied during the day's fighting.

At 1830 an enemy counterattack struck elements of the 3rd Bn in the draw at TA 114 F, causing 20 casualties. Enemy infiltration patrols were extremely active throughout the entire area occupied by the 3rd Bn.

A Red Air Raid Alert was in effect from 2145 to 2340. Enemy planes dropped four bombs into water off Beach Blue.

27 SEPTEMBER 1944  
(FOX Plus 10 Days)

At 0730 the 3rd Bn resumed its advance to the northwest moving across the open ground of the bowl in the face of heavy enemy fire from TA 117 W and X. By late afternoon it reached a general east-



west line through TA 113 C,D where it established a perimeter defense for the night. The 2nd Bn moved west and occupied the ground vacated by the 3rd Bn, extending its line to the north coast to block a possible escape route for the enemy in that direction. The 1st Bn moved north along the ridge in TA 113 R and advanced approximately 200 yards over extremely rough terrain, meeting considerable opposition from enemy sniper fire. Casualties during the day were heavy, and evacuation was effected through Beach Black.

Enemy action during the night consisted of infiltration into the position occupied by Co G along the north coast, but our casualties were light.

Fire support ships fired illuminating shells over the northwest corner of the island throughout the night.



28 SEPTEMBER 1944  
(FOX Plus 11 Days)

At 0600 heavy enemy machine gun fire from TA 113 N1 was directed against the position of Co I in TA 113 N. The 2nd Bn was ordered to attack to the west immediately to relieve the pressure on Co I. In its advance the 2nd Bn cleared several enemy fortifications and destroyed a 75mm dual purpose gun in TA 114 F. With the assistance of the drive by the 2nd Bn, Co I and Co B began to advance northward inside of the western rim of the bowl, and by 1500 reached positions to the left of and in line with the 3rd Bn.

Co C moved north along the western coast and by 1100 reached the northwest tip of the island where it established a perimeter defense. Strong combat patrols operated to the east and southeast searching out enemy defenses. These patrols contacted friendly troops in TA 113 B and C.

By 1530 friendly troops formed a continuous line just south of the main defenses occupied by the enemy. In addition, one rifle company on each flank of the enemy defenses was in position to block any attempt by the enemy to escape.

At 1700 heavy concentrations of enemy mortar fire caused Co B and Co I to withdraw from positions which they later reoccupied. There was no enemy activity during hours of darkness.



29 SEPTEMBER 1944  
(FOX Plus 12 Days)

Beginning at 0700 Division Artillery fired a one hour preparation into enemy defenses in TA 117 W,V,X. Co C was withdrawn from the northwest tip of the island during the period to avoid interference with the firing. At 0800 troops along the entire front converged slowly on enemy positions, confining resistance to area in TA 117 W,B,X. The 2nd Bn completed mopping up the entire bowl area in rear of front line troops, destroying enemy emplacements and capturing a 37mm gun, 45mm dual purpose gun and a supply dump. Upon completion of its mission the battalion, less Co E, was concentrated in the vicinity of TA 117 T,Y, and Co E reverted to regimental reserve at TA 114 A.

30 SEPTEMBER 1944  
(FOX Plus 13 Days)

At 0800 elements of the 1st and 3rd Bns attacked to the north and by 1130 succeeded in occupying the ridge on the north rim of the bowl. Enemy resistance consisted of heavy machine gun fire and sniper fire.

Immediately to the north of the captured ridge was a deep ravine and another ridge in which the enemy had retreated for a final stand. The 3rd Bn reorganized and continued the attack; but due to the difficulties of terrain and enemy resistance, progress was slow.


1 OCTOBER 1944  
(FOX Plus 14 Days)

At 0630 the 1st and 3rd Bns resumed the attack to the north over the most difficult terrain yet encountered. Enemy resistance was fierce and made a frontal assault costly. An attempt was made to probe around the right flank of the enemy position; and a route was discovered which bypassed it and led to the sea, without affording an access to the enemy stronghold itself.

The 2nd Bn was sent along the north coast to destroy enemy troops attempting to escape from the attack of the 1st and 3rd Bns. It reached the northwest tip of the island where it met stout resistance from enemy troops entrenched on the high ground in TA 117 P,U. The battalion succeeded in taking the hill and organized it for defense.



REGT.  
RES.



2 OCTOBER 1944

COMBAT  
PATROLS




REGT. RES.



REGT. RES.

3 OCTOBER 1944



# **NARRATIVE OF THE ASSAULT ON ANGAUR ISLAND**

**PALAU ISLANDS**

**BABELTHUAP I.**


**KORROR I.**

**URUKTHAPELI I.**

**EIL MALK I.**

**PELELIU I.**

**ANGAUR I.**



2 OCTOBER 1944  
(FOX Plus 15 Days)

In a continuing effort to rout the enemy from his hiding place and destroy him, the 1st and 3rd Bns advanced to the south edge of TA 117 W,X. The 1st Bn, on the left, overran a strong enemy position in TA 117 W capturing an ammunition dump and destroying eighteen Japanese defenders.

3-22 OCTOBER 1944  
(FOX Plus 16-35 Days)


After all previous attempts to reach the enemy stronghold had failed to achieve rapid and decisive results, a plan was devised wherein the enemy was contained by an overwhelming force and harried by small combat patrols and demolition teams. Protective wire was constructed around the enemy's position to prevent a mass attempt to escape the trap. As limited objectives were seized, consolidated and reinforced, the perimeter closed in to further restrict the enemy's movement. By 17 October the area of resistance was compressed into an area of about 200 yards square.

Various strategems were used to entice the enemy from his hiding places. Food and water were located where they were covered by friendly sniper and automatic weapons fire. Trails were wired and booby trapped to catch unwary Japanese attempting to infiltrate through our lines. Attacks were feinted in one direction to draw the enemy's attention away from real attacks in another. On one occasion forward elements were withdrawn under cover of darkness to permit artillery concentrations as though to initiate an attack. As ground troops advanced, Japanese manned their weapons and heavy concentrations of artillery were laid down on their positions. Combat patrols and demolition teams attacked caves with grenades, dynamite, fuzed 4.2 shells, and gasoline. Anti-sniper teams were active in combatting enemy snipers.

Direct artillery fire was employed to blast passageways through the impenetrable rocky formations which guarded the approaches to the deep caves and crevices in which the enemy had taken refuge. On 6 October a reinforced concrete structure, believed to be the enemy command post, was uncovered by such fire and destroyed. Engineers constructed roads along the north and west coast and within the bowl which permitted the approach of tanks to close assault distance and eased the problem of supply and evacuation.

By a combination of offensive action, strategems and attrition, approximately 350 Japanese were killed during the period 3-19 October. During the night 19-20 October the commander of the Japanese forces on Angaur was killed, deterioration of Japanese resistance set in rapidly thereafter. Of the one hundred or so who remained, many were killed in an attempt to escape the pocket; others committed suicide in the face of a hopeless situation. On 21 October ten Japanese surrendered as a result of a loudspeaker broadcast. At 1700, 22 October our troops overran the last Japanese stronghold and began a final clean-up of the entire area. Some Japanese managed to filter through to the coast and into the interior of the island where they were hunted down and killed or captured.

\* \* \* \* \*



N

PANORAMA  
FACING NORTH  
ROMAULDO HILL  
ANGAUR ISLAND

Panorama: Facing  
North Romauldo Hill  
Angaur Island




Panorama: Facing  
North Romauldo Hill  
Angaur Island- photo 1

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


Panorama: Facing  
North Romauldo Hill  
Angaur Island- photo 2





Panorama: Facing  
North Romauldo Hill  
Angaur Island- photo 3






Panorama: Facing  
North Romauldo Hill  
Angaur Island- photo 4

B



Panorama: Facing  
North Romauldo Hill  
Angaur Island- photo 5





PANORAMA  
BOWL AREA  
FACING NORTH  
ANGAUR ISLAND

Panorama: Bowl  
Area Facing North  
Angaur Island



Panorama: Bowl  
Area Facing North  
Angaur Island -photo 1

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


Panorama: Bowl  
Area Facing North  
Angaur Island –photo 2

NAME BY PRINT BY

"Movement was beset with...  
Difficulties of terrain and  
Thick underbrush"

"Movement was beset with ...  
difficulties of terrain  
and thick underbrush."



**"Movement was beset with..  
Difficulties of terrain and  
Thick underbrush" –photo 1**

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306TH  
ENGINEER  
COMBAT  
BATTALION

"Food & Water were located  
Where they were covered by  
Friendly sniper & automate fire."

"Food and water were located where  
they were covered by friendly  
sniper and automatic fire."



3P111-2

**"Food & Water were located  
Where they were covered by  
Friendly sniper & automate fire."**

Photo 1

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
"Difficulties of terrain and  
strong enemy resistance ...  
combined to make the attack  
slow and costly."

**"Difficulties of terrain & strong  
Enemy resistance... combined  
to make the attack slow &  
costly."**




(13P)(11-8-44)

"Difficulties of terrain & strong  
Enemy resistance... combined  
to make the attack slow &  
costly." —photo 1



**ESTIMATED  
RESULTS OF  
OPERATION**



## SECTION IX - ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATION

### A - AREA SECURED

1. The capture of Angaur has assisted in eliminating the Palau Island Group as a base for enemy sea and air operations against our forces, in securing our lines of communications as we approach the main enemy's forces to the north and west, and in neutralizing an estimated 25,000 enemy troops who still remain on the unoccupied islands of the Palau Island Group.

2. The operation of the airbase on Angaur will facilitate the neutralization and destruction of other Japanese bases which lie along our route of advance. It can also serve as a staging area for aviation to our bases further west.

### B - ENEMY CASUALTIES

1. An estimated 1338 Japanese soldiers were killed on Angaur Island which, with prisoners captured, approximates closely data obtained from captured documents and prisoners on the enemy strength prior to the assault.

2. Fifty-nine military prisoners were taken, of which 7 were officers. A few surrendered as a direct result of propaganda broadcasts by the Division Language Team. Surrender pleas stressed the futility of further resistance, humane treatment, food and water, and medical care. Prisoners stated that more would have surrendered were it not for interference on the part of their officers. They considered their situation hopeless and felt they had nothing to lose by surrendering.

3. A total of 190 native civilian and 13 Japanese civilian prisoners were taken into custody. All but 6 of the natives gave themselves up as a result of propaganda appeals, after hiding for almost a month in the caves in the northwest corner of the island. The Japanese civilians were taken into custody after the Japanese soldiers had been driven from the caves and dugouts in which they had been hiding. Native civilians made one attempt to give themselves up, but were fired on by our troops who failed to recognize them as civilians. All returned to their caves, except one family of 6 who were taken into custody by friendly troops. A party of soldiers guided by a female member of the family returned for the remainder, but could not approach the caves due to enemy activity. A propaganda leaflet was prepared by the Division Language Team and signed by the head of the captive family, telling of the kind treatment afforded the family and giving directions on how to surrender. Four thousand mimeographed copies of this leaflet were dropped by plane. After a few days, 87 natives surrendered, and the same night three young native men returned to bring out the remainder. The following morning they returned with an additional 89. Natives stated that Japanese soldiers had collected and hidden the leaflets, and that they had found one only the day before the first group left their caves.

ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS OF PROPAGANDA USED ON ANGAUR ISLAND

The following is a translation of a broadcast made by members of the 81st Division Language Team to surrounded Japanese soldiers on Angaur Island:

"Japanese soldiers: This island is surrounded by the American forces; and there is no reason for you to continue fighting against us. Further resistance is hopeless. Your communication and supply lines are cut. The Japanese Navy is far away. If you resist further, you will surely die by starvation and bombardment.

"If you cease fighting and come to us immediately, one by one, unarmed and with your hands up, you will receive food, clothing, and medical care.

"To die when encountered by a hopeless situation is neither heroic nor brave, and is only a useless death. Come over to us singly, unarmed and with your hands up. We give you (time allotted) to come to us; otherwise we will be forced to take the only alternative action."

\* \* \* \* \*

The Japanese translation of the following document was dropped from plane to natives and Japanese civilian personnel who were trapped with Japanese forces on Angaur Island:

"Attention: Natives and Japanese civilians. My dear Friends: Are you well? My American soldier friend is writing this for me. I am your friend, Ramon Kaburera. When I came out I was hit by a stray bullet, but the American soldiers have given me medical care and I am getting well. My wife, Maria Saburan, my children, Rosario, Vicente, and Maria, and my relative, Anna Regis, are with me and living safely under the care of the American soldiers. Each day we receive plenty of water, food, tobacco, etc., and we are happy and amply protected. I assure you that the American soldier will not kill us or harm us in any way. Therefore I am writing this letter to urge you to come out. When you come out, go to the GOTEPO seashore and turn left (west). Come out as a group and if possible raise some white cloth and come in the daylight.

"Aidoeval, Irena, Rosa, Tere, Asuel, and Mrs. Mine and children call everyone and come out. I'll be waiting for you. Finally, if you think of your children's welfare, come out, for it is wise to submit yourself to the protection of the American Soldiers. Our children have forgotten the experience in the caves and are eating candy. As a parent, when I see the happy faces of my children I am deeply touched. Over and over again I am thankful that I made the decision to come out of the cave. I am praying for your welfare and success. If you see an aeroplane fly overhead, rest assured for it is for your protection.

"Attention: Japanese soldiers: If you have any of the beautiful chivalrous spirit of Bushido, I beg of you not to fire upon the helpless civilians and natives, pitiable, innocent children and frail women, because they have no part in this war.

~~SECRET~~ - OPERATIONAL MATERIEL DAMAGE TO THE ENEMY

1. As estimated by Major Goto, the Japanese Commander on Angaur, there was sufficient food stocks to supply 1300 troops for a period of 20 months. These were either captured or destroyed. (\*)
2. Only limited quantities of clothing were captured. Japanese troops were almost completely without reserves of clothing. (\*)
3. Ammunition amounting to approximately 8 units of fire for all weapons, except 75mm, 25mm and 20mm AA, and 150mm mortar were captured. Only small quantities of ammunition for the latter named weapons were found. (\*)
4. Weapons captured and/or destroyed included the following:

4	150mm medium mortars, Type 97
4	75mm field guns, Type 38
4	75mm AA DP guns; Type 88
2	70mm Bn howitzers, Type 92
3	47mm AT rapid fire guns, Type 1
2	20mm AA/AT Auto Cannon, Type 98
6	37mm AT rapid fire guns, Type 94
12	Heavy machine guns, Type 92 (*)
36	Light machine guns, Type 99 (*)
36	Grenade dischargers, Type 89 (*)
800	Rifles, Type 99 (*)

5. Precision instruments captured and/or destroyed included the following:

1	2 meter range finder, Type 93
2	BC scopes
2	10 cm AA field glasses, Type 89
15	Trench periscopes, Type 93 (*)

Several instruments for calculating artillery data.

6. Eight trucks of 1½-Ton capacity were captured, of which 5 were put into serviceable condition.

7. Communications equipment destroyed included 2 large radio and telegraph stations, 2 field switchboards, and an undetermined number of commercial and field telephones. A commercial telephone switchboard and a 2 wheel communication cart were captured after being partially damaged.

8. Engineer equipment captured and/or destroyed included the following:

Small quantities of demolitions, mines, cement, and barbed wire.

Parts of 3 small capacity water purification units.


1. Small concrete mixer.
8. Narrow gauge diesel locomotives, Type 4 cylinder chain drive of Japanese manufacture.
3. Narrow gauge steam locomotives, Type 0-4-0 of German manufacture.
1. Chain bucket loader on caterpillar treads of American manufacture.
2. Small floating dredges.
4. Generators, estimated 50. KW capacity, (seriously damaged).
1. Large stationary boiler (seriously damaged).
4. Lathes (repairable)
1. Drill (repairable)

Lumber mill reported to be on island (\*) was not found.


9. Three horses, 3 two-wheeled carts, and reserve supplies of harnesses were captured. The horses had shell fragment wounds, but became serviceable after being given veterinary treatment.

10. Very few medical supplies were found. Prisoners reported a shortage of medical supplies and equipment, and that officers encouraged the wounded to commit suicide. Two aid stations were captured and a field hospital destroyed, but practically no medical supplies were found in them.

(\*) Estimates of quantities indicated are based on PW statements and Major Goto's situation reports of 1-31 August 1944, corroborated by observation and investigation of 81 Infantry Division agencies.



OPERATIONAL  
FEATURES



## SECTION X - OPERATIONAL FEATURES

### A - SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT

1. Planning: Planning for the loading and landing of troops was initiated after the scheme of maneuver ashore had been developed. Commanders of all echelons determined the composition of landing units and the landing priority of personnel, supplies, and equipment. Representatives of the Division and Naval Attack Force then formulated plans to effect the landing as desired, on the proper beaches, and with good control and coordination.

2. Rehearsals: The rehearsals at Maui and Guadalcanal served to test the landing plan which had been made. Certain deficiencies became apparent and were corrected prior to the operation. These included the placing of a Division representative on the primary control vessel and perfection of timing and control of supply movement.

#### 3. Operations:

a. At 0600 Fox Day, the Comdr Angaur Assault Group, Asst Div Comdr, and Div G-4 boarded the Primary Control Vessel and devoted the  $2\frac{1}{2}$  hours to George Hour to checking on control units, boating of assault troops, and state of readiness of boat waves. By 0755 assault troops were completely boated and the first waves in the vicinity of the line of departure. High priority supply and equipment boats were in position in ample time.

b. Leading waves crossed the line of departure at 0810. The landing on Beach Blue was made at 0830; on Beach Red at 0836, the six minute delay being due to a cross current off the Beach. LVTs moved cautiously due to the presence of offshore mines. Succeeding assault waves landed approximately according to the schedule which had been set. The time interval between waves was the same as the number of the wave, i.e., the second wave followed the first by 2 minutes, the third followed the second by 3 minutes. The maximum scheduled interval between waves was 6 minutes. Beaches were kept clear at all times, except when boats were broached.

c. All combat team attachments, except artillery, were landed on order of the combat team commanders. RCT tanks and bulldozers were assembled in the vicinity of the appropriate beach control vessel to be available for early dispatch to the beaches. Landings of major supporting units and equipment were effected at times shown:

<u>Unit or Equipment</u>	<u>Controlled By</u>	<u>Day</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Beach</u>
Bulldozer	RCT 321	Fox	0840	Blue
Bulldozer	RCT 322	Fox	0910	Red
Co A, 710 Tank Bn	RCT 321	Fox	0944	Blue
Co B, 710 Tank Bn	RCT 322	Fox	0958	Red
BLT 322-2 (RCT Res)	RCT 322	Fox	1045	Red
Hq 710 Tank Bn	Division	Fox	1130	Red
Hq RCT 321	RCT 321	Fox	1140	Blue
Hq RCT 322	RCT 322	Fox	1230	Red
Rcn Party, 906 FA Bn	Division	Fox	1300	Red
BLT 321-3 (Div Res)	Division	Fox	1431	Blue
906 FA Bn (105mm How)	Division	Fox	1500	Red
Co C, 710 Tank Bn (Div Res)	Division	Fox	1615	Red
316 FA Bn (105mm How)	Division	Fox	1730	Red
Hq Div Arty	Division	Fox	1800	Red
81 Cav Rcn Tr	Division	Fox <del>1</del>	0755	Red
Div. Hq (Able Group)	Division	Fox <del>1</del>	0755	Red
Div Hq (Baker Group)	Division	Fox <del>1</del>	0900	Red
Div Hq (Charlie Group)	Division	Fox <del>1</del>	1300	Red
318 FA Bn (-) (155mm How)	Division	Fox <del>1</del>	1610	Blue
Btry A, 483 AAA (AW) Bn	Division	Fox <del>1</del>	2330	Red
Co C, 306 Engr Bn	Division	Fox <del>2</del>	1200	Red
Co D, 710 Tank Bn	Division	Fox <del>2</del>	1230	Red
Btry C, 318 FA Bn (155mm How)	Division	Fox <del>2</del>	1300	Red
483 AAA (AW) Bn (-)	Division	Fox <del>3</del>	0030	Red
Btry D, 483 AAA (AW) Bn	Division	Fox <del>4</del>	0700	Blue

d. During Fox Day, the landing of artillery was delayed pending the construction of access roads. Mines off Beach Blue impeded the free flow of landing craft to the beach. During the afternoon surf and swell conditions were such that all landings were made with difficulty. Priority was given to the landing of sufficient bulldozers to break down the steep banks on the beach, to clear the debris which had resulted from the naval bombardment, to construct roads inland from the beach and to clear areas for dumps.

e. During Fox plus one, landings continued to be hampered by difficult surf conditions and the presence of mines off Beach Blue. The construction of causeways was initiated and completed on Fox plus 3 and Fox plus 6 on Beaches Red and Blue respectively.

f. In general, the ship to shore movement was completed in a satisfactory manner. Communication between the Primary Control Vessel and the Flagship was excellent, and aided materially to the efficiency of control.

B - SHORE PARTY

1. Reconnaissance elements of each shore party consisting of one officer and twelve men landed in the 7th wave. The remainder of the shore party arrived in the 10th and 11th waves. Security, dumps, CPs, and CIC were established immediately, and the beaches cleared of supplies that were dropped by LVTs and combat troops. Roads to dump areas were constructed and supplies moved into them. At the close of Fox Day dump levels were such that no emergency requisitions were necessary.
2. On Fox plus 1, shore parties continued the unloading, using the following operational set-up:
  - a. One company was assigned to the operation of the beach with responsibility for unloading cargo from naval craft and moving it to the high water mark.
  - b. Another company was assigned to operation of dumps with responsibility of hauling cargo from the high water mark to dump areas where supplies were segregated, stacked, recorded, and issued.
  - c. Personnel and equipment of the third company were employed to reinforce the two operating companies as required.
3. On Fox Day advance elements of Shore Party Group Headquarters landed, and at 1200 on Fox plus 2 both Red and Blue Beach shore parties were placed under centralized control of Engineer Group Headquarters.
4. Heavy equipment used by each shore party company consisted of one D-8, two D-7-s, two D-6-s, and three D-4 tractors with blades, and one M-5 crane. Each shore party battalion had available one M-20 and two Bucyrus-Erie cranes for disposition as required.
5. Advance elements of garrison force headquarters landed with members of Division Headquarters on Fox plus 1. Liaison was established with Division Headquarters to coordinate location of roads and permanent supply dumps with similar tactical installations in areas tentatively determined by study prior to landing. The major portion of garrison force troops and equipment did not start to land before Fox plus 7.
6. During the combat unloading phase there were only two emergency requisitions, and these were for salt tablets and 4.2 mortar ammunition; both were delivered promptly. During this period shore

parties extended the road network from dumps to RCTs and completed the lateral road connecting Beaches Red and Blue.

7. Due to the narrow front and terrain condition of Beach Red, separate roads for wheeled and tracked vehicles were not constructed. This proved undesirable since the flow of traffic on the one road was slowed down to the speed of the tracked vehicles. Congestion on Beach Red occurred from time to time due to the necessity of establishing dumps close to the beach. On Beach Blue the terrain allowed for the establishment of dumps far enough removed from the beach to allow for good circulation of traffic.
8. Due to the shallow beaches and surf conditions, unloading was impossible at high tide. A pontoon causeway on Beach Red was not completely available until Fox plus 4, and then workable only in perfect surf and tide conditions.
9. Shore parties unloaded a total of 9800 tons of cargo during the combat phase and through Fox plus 7, 24 September.

#### C - PUBLIC RELATIONS

1. Prior to the Division's departure from Oahu, a Press Relations Officer and assistant were appointed to act as liaison between the Division and the accredited press correspondents. A non-commissioned officer was selected to accompany each combat team to act as combat correspondent, write stories of military activity, and furnish local color stories for the accredited correspondents.
2. No accredited press representatives were assigned to the Division prior to departure from Oahu. CPA Public Relations Officers joined the Division at Guadalcanal. A few press correspondents joined the Division at Guadalcanal. The bulk of the correspondents landed on Angaur on Fox Day, coming from Peleliu. These included representatives of the United Press, Associated Press, Boston Globe, Chicago Tribune, News Week, Time, and Fox Movietone News. They returned to their ships after a brief tour ashore and most of them were unaware of the difficult fighting that developed in the northwest part of the island.
3. On Fox Day the Army correspondents assigned to combat teams landed at 0922 and 1230 with RCTs 322 and 321 respectively. They began gathering leads for local stories and determining the identities of individuals performing outstanding feats in order to assist accredited correspondents when they came ashore.
4. On Fox plus 1 the Press Relations Office was established ashore with Division Headquarters to give press representatives all possible information, direction, and assistance.

## D - NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT

### 1. General:

a. The Naval gunfire plan was designed to provide as much of the support desired by the 81st Infantry Division as was practicable considering the ships and ammunition available. The original plan was revised during the latter part of the trip to the objective area in order to conform with the latest intelligence reports and with changes in the composition of the Fire Support Group. This report deals only with the actual naval gunfire support received.

b. The plan was designed primarily to accomplish the following:

- (1) Effect the maximum practicable destruction of all known enemy defensive installations prior to the landing.
- (2) Provide complete destruction of personnel and installations in areas within 200 yards to front and flanks of landing beaches, to permit assault waves to land without casualties.
- (3) Box-in and isolate initial beachhead areas, preventing enemy counterattacks for at least one-half hour after the initial landing.

2. Preliminary Bombardment: The preliminary bombardment of Angaur Island commenced on 12 September and continued through 16 September. This bombardment consisted of slow deliberate fire for destruction during daylight and relative light harassing fires at night. Known defensive installations were destroyed as much as was practicable; the area behind and immediately adjacent to the landing beaches specified in the Preferred Plan were partially stripped of foliage; covering fire was provided for the mine sweepers and underwater demolition teams. Of the ammunition available for the entire operation, approximately 48% of the 14", 60% of the 8" and 51% of the 6", and 36% of the 5" were expended during this phase.

### 3. Bombardment between 0500-0900, 17 September:

a. The Division landed on Beach Red at 0836 and Beach Blue at 0830 on 17 September. The naval gunfire between 0530 and 0900 consisted of the scheduled fires shown on inclosures Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4. An air strike from 0735 to 0750, during which gunfire was scheduled to cease, was delayed, and the fire support ships were ordered to extend the fires scheduled for the period 0530 - 0735 to 0750. The air strike was made later without stopping naval gunfire. This phase of the naval gunfire program used 48% of the 14", 33% of the 8", 38% of the 6", and 38% of the 5" ammunition.

b. During the period 0800-0822, LCI(G)s fired 40mm and 20mm guns into the beach areas, and fired rockets when approximately

1100 yards from the beaches. LCI(M)s fired 4.2" mortars continuously throughout the period, covering the beach area up to a depth of 500 yards. Two LCI(G)s and four LCI(M)s were assigned to Beach Red, and seven LCI(G)s were assigned to Beach Blue. The LCI(G)s moved to the beach flanks at 0822, and delivered observed 40mm fire on positively identified targets along the shore line in front of our troops as long as the disposition of our troops permitted.

4. Fire Subsequent to 0900, 17 September:


a. Scheduled Fires: The only fires scheduled after those shown in Incl No. 4 were the ones prepared for the nights of 17-18, 18-19, and 19-20 September and prior to the attacks on the mornings of 18 and 19 September. These fires were planned a few hours prior to the time they were started, and were based on the requests of the troops on the ground. The fires at night consisted mostly of illumination of the front lines, with some harassing fires in the south end of the island during the first two nights. The two preparations prior to the morning attacks consumed most of the ammunition remaining aboard the ships. They were generally placed well in front of our troops, with the field artillery furnishing the close-in preparation.


b. Call Fires: Call fires were used very little. The terrain was such that our troops could not observe fire on targets more than a few hundred yards away, and the formation of our troops after the landing was such that fire placed directly in front of one unit would have endangered another unit. The requests for fire were relatively few, and most of the requests had to be refused because of danger to other troops.


5. Results: The results of the naval gunfire were very satisfactory. The second and third of the three primary missions noted above were completely fulfilled. There were no casualties from enemy fire until after the troops had landed, and no counterattacks until well after all scheduled fires had been completed. The destruction of enemy installations was very satisfactory. Most of the known installations which could be reached by naval gunfire were destroyed or neutralized prior to the landing.

Inclosures:


- No. 1 - Scheduled Fires, 0530-0735, 17 Sept 1944
- No. 2 - Scheduled Fires, 0750-0822, 17 Sept 1944
- No. 3 - Scheduled Fires, 0822-0830, 17 Sept 1944
- No. 4 - Scheduled Fires, 0830-0900, 17 Sept 1944










INCLOSURE NO 2  
SCHEDULED FIRES  
0750-0822  
17 SEPT. 1944  
Map: ANGAUR ISLAND  
SCALE 1/20,000










INCLOSURE NO 4  
SCHEDULED FIRES  
0830-0900  
17 SEPT. 1944  
Map. ANGAUR ISLAND  
SCALE 1/20,000



## E - AIR SUPPORT DURING ASSAULT PHASE

1. General: The Air Support Plan was designed to accomplish the following:

- a. Neutralize enemy defenses prior to the landing of troops.
- b. Support the landing of assault troops during such time as Naval gunfire could not accomplish this mission.
- c. Provide close support for ground troops by executing call missions.
- d. Attack targets of opportunity and definitely located installations beyond the range of observation of ground troops.

2. Preliminary Strikes: Preliminary attacks on Angaur were made by land and carrier based planes prior to the arrival of the Division at the objective area and continued through 16 September. Enemy installations at Saipan Town, Middle Village, Lighthouse Hill and all beach defenses were heavily attacked and partially neutralized. PW reports confirmed that these attacks caused considerable destruction of personnel, installations, and supplies.

### 3. Prelanding Strikes:

a. George Hour and Fox Day were 0830, 17 September. A pre-George Hour air strike by 44 planes was scheduled from 0735-0750, but was delayed as planes were late in reporting on station. The air strike was launched at 0748 and completed at 0800 on targets just inland of Beaches Red and Blue. Forty planes participated, including 16 VFs, 16 VBs, and 8 VTs. Excellent results were reported by the Air Observer.

b. Strafing attacks on landing beaches were scheduled during the period when the first assault waves were making the last 1000 yards of approach to the shore. The signal for the beginning of this attack was two red flares fired from an LCI off each beach. The strafing attack on Beach Blue was launched at 0825; on Beach Red at 0828. Both attacks continued until first waves landed. Good results and timing were reported by the Air Observer.

4. Direct Air Support: Direct air support planes were on station from 0615 - 1815 daily during the period 17-20 Sept inclusive. All air support was dispensed with after 20 Sept due to the close proximity of friendly troops to targets.

a. During the period 17-20 September, the following direct air support missions were executed:

b. Attacks on enemy troop concentrations and open emplacements were very effective. Effect against caves and strong pillboxes was negligible. No estimate is available on effect of Napalm attacks.

c. On 18 September two air missions requested by RCT 321 resulted in attacks at 1015 and 1038, some of which fell on advanced elements of RCT 322, causing a number of casualties.


d. On 17 September planes were employed to lay a smoke screen over the high ground in the northwest corner of Angaur Island to prevent enemy observation of friendly troops. The smoke screen was laid too high and proved ineffective.

5. Air Observers: One infantry air observer per RCT was employed during the period 17-20 September. They furnished valuable information concerning location of friendly troops, enemy defenses, and terrain. When requested they adjusted artillery and naval gunfire.


6. Artillery Spotters: During the first two days of the operation CVEs furnished TBFs for air spot. On Fox plus 2, artillery liaison planes were based on Peleliu and air spot provided from there. On 23 September, an airstrip for liaison planes was completed on Angaur and air spot was provided from there for the remainder of the operation.


Inclosures:

No. 1 - Attacks on targets of opportunity, 17-20 Sept.  
No. 2 - Air Support Missions executed for RCT 321, 17-20 Sept.  
No. 3 - Air Support Missions executed for RCT 322, 17-20 Sept.




INCLOSURE N°1  
ATTACKS ON TARGETS  
OF OPPORTUNITY  
17-20 SEPT 1944  
Map ANGAUR ISLAND  
SCALE 1/20,000






INCLOSURE NO 2  
SUPPORT MISSIONS  
EXECUTED FOR RCT 321  
17-20 SEPT 1944  
Map. ANGAUR ISLAND  
SCALE 1/20,000



■ BOMBS + STRAFING  
■ BOMBS + NAPALM  
■ STRAFING

INCLUSION NO 3  
SUPPORT MISSIONS  
EXECUTED FOR RCT 322  
17-20 SEPT 1944  
Map: ANGALUR ISLAND  
SCALE 1/20,000.





F - ARTILLERY EMPLOYMENT

1. General: The initial plan for the employment of the 81st Division Artillery was for the 316 FA Bn (105mm Hows) to land on Beach Red on Fox Day, occupy a position just south of the Beach, and support RCT 321; the 317 FA Bn (105mm Hows) to land on Beach Blue on Fox Day, occupy a position just north of the Beach, and support RCT 322; the 906 FA Bn (105mm Hows) to land on Beach Red occupy a position north of the Beach and be in general support and reinforce the fire of the 316 FA Bn; the 318 FA Bn (155mm Hows) to land on Beach Red on Fox plus 1 occupy a position adjacent to the 906 FA Bn, and be in general support. The decision to land the direct support battalions behind the RCT it was not to support was made to provide sufficient range for artillery fire earlier than would have been possible otherwise. RCTs were to advise Division Hqs when areas within their zones of action were available for the emplacement of artillery.

2. Operations during the Attack:

a. 17 September: The assault on Angaur was made at 0830 and by 1200, RCT 322 reported the area northwest of Beach Red sufficiently clear of enemy to be used by an artillery battalion. The 906 FA Bn was landed, and by 1500 had completed occupation of the area. Shortly thereafter the battalion was registered by air observer and rendered direct support to RCT 321. It fired harrassing and interdiction fires throughout the night. At 1500 sufficient area just south of Beach Red was cleared to permit its occupation by the 316 FA Bn. The battalion landed just prior to darkness. Night registration was impossible due to enemy activity. The Commanding General Division Artillery and staff landed on Beach Red at dusk and established a CP and effective communications during the night.


b. 18 September: The 316 FA Bn completed registration at daybreak and then rendered direct support to RCT 322. Preparation fires for the continuation of the attack were delivered by the 316 FA Bn and 906 FA Bn. The landing of the 317 FA Bn was delayed because of enemy activity in the area it was to occupy. At 1600 the battalion landed on Beach Blue and occupied a position just to the northwest of the Beach. After registration by the 317 FA Bn, all battalions reverted to their originally assigned missions. The 318 FA Bn (less Btry C) landed on Beach Red during the afternoon and occupied a position just west of the 906 FA Bn, but did not register. The 316, 317, and 906 FA Bns conducted harrassing and interdiction fires throughout the night.

c. 19 September: Heavy preparation fires for the continuation of the attack were delivered by the three light battalions. Four liaison planes which had been carried on CVEs landed on the Pelciu

155 HOW DIRECT FIRE INTO THIS AREA



155MM  
318  
5-6 OCT



LOCATIONS OF  
FIELD ARTILLERY BNS  
DURING  
ANGAUR OPERATION  
Map: ANGAUR ISLAND  
SCALE 1/20,000

airport, and continuous air observation was possible thereafter. Btry C, 318 FA Bn, was landed during the morning and joined the remainder of the battalion. The 318 FA Bn was registered by air observer. One battery of the 8th FA Bn (155mm Gun) (Marine), in position on Peleliu, was made available to the Division and registered during the morning. This battery fired sporadically during the remainder of the day and the following two nights. At 1300 the 906 FA Bn reverted to control of RCT 323 and reembarked for employment at Ulithi. During the night the 316 and 317 FA Bns fired occasional missions into the northwest corner of the island.

d. 20 September: Throughout the day and night the 316 and 317 FA Bns continued to fire into the northwest corner of the island. Btry C, 318 FA Bn, moved into position in vicinity of the 317 FA Bn in order to be able to fire into the same area.

e. 21 September - 4 October: During this period all artillery fire was directed into the northwest corner of the island. Calls for day firing were frequent; for night firing exceptional. Considerable interdiction and harrassing fires were delivered nightly. The greater part of the firing was conducted by the 317 FA Bn and Btry C, 318 FA Bn. The 316 FA Bn and the remainder of the 318 FA Bn were moved to positions in TAs 103 and 106 respectively in order to be able to fire into TAs 113 and 117.

f. 5 October: On 5 October one howitzer of the 318 FA Bn went into position in TA 113 S and placed direct fire into caves in 117 Y. The fire was directed by artillery observers in a medium tank stationed about 200 yards from the point of impact. During the day the remainder of the battery was emplaced in the same position area and augmented the fire of the single howitzer. Results were good.

g. 6 October: Two batteries of the 318 FA Bn were emplaced in 113 S and fired for most of the day into the cliffs in TAs 117 V, W, X, Y. The range was approximately 800 yards. The 317 FA Bn fired into the same general area using air observation. Infantry reported the results of this fire to be valuable, inasmuch as they were able to advance into the area without significant casualties.

### 3. Comments:

a. The small size of Angaur and the type of terrain encountered restricted the physical value of the artillery to a considerable extent. The short ranges made close support of the infantry difficult. Observation, except from the air, was poor; and forward observers had difficulty locating targets which were not too close to friendly front lines.

b. Artillery lost its effect against the type of terrain encountered in the northwest part of the island. The innumerable deep caves and crevices, usually facing away from the direction of attack, afforded excellent protection from artillery fire. With the exception of the destructive effect of direct fire, about all artillery could do was to increase visibility by stripping foliage, keeping enemy personnel under cover, and affording great morale value to the infantry.

4. Ammunition Expenditures:

a. 105mm Howitzer Ammunition:

Type	316 FA	317 FA	906 FA	Total
Shell, HE, Fuze M48 (SQ&T) and Fuze M48A1	2100	8823	3048	13,971
Shell, HE, Fuze M54 (SQ&T)	2060	3894	587	6,541
Shell, Smoke, WP, Fuze M57	165	1238	31	1,434
Shell, HE, AT, Fuze M62	0	0	0	0
Cannister	12	0	0	0
Total	4337	13955	3666	21,958

b. 155mm Howitzer Ammunition:

Shell, HE, M107	4923
Shell, Smoke, M105 (WP)	107
Shell, Smoke, M116 (BES)	6
Total	5036

Charges, Green Bag	2311
Charges, White Bag (M4)	1506
Charges, White Bag (M4A1)	1219
Total	5036

Fuze, M51A3 (SQ&D)	4443
Fuze, M55A1 (SQ&T)	89
Fuze, M54 (BES)	6
Fuze, T105 (Conc)	498
Total	5036

Primers	5069
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G - TANKS - EMPLOYMENT

1. Attachments: One company of medium tanks was attached initially to each RCT with the remainder of the battalion in Division Reserve. Attachments varied as changes in the situation occurred. In one instance, the entire battalion, less one platoon, was attached to RCT 321 to assist in clearing the southern half of the island. The usual allocation of tanks by RCTs was a platoon to each BLT. BLTs further suballocated these tanks by section or platoon to assault companies.
2. Landing Phase: Tanks attached to RCTs were landed at 0944 and 0958 on Fox Day on Beaches Blue and Red respectively. Landing of assault companies was made without incident. Co C, part of the Division Reserve, was landed on Beach Red at 1630 the same day, and two tanks were lost during transit from ships. Company D in Division Reserve was landed on Fox plus 3.
3. Employment:
  - a. In general, the terrain precluded the utilization of tanks in a mass greater than one platoon. One assault unit of 15 tanks accompanied by 90 infantrymen riding on the tanks, was employed on a combat-reconnaissance mission well behind probable enemy positions in the southern half of the island. This column met no resistance, but did establish, as was later proved, that the enemy either had been destroyed or evacuated to other defensive positions on the island.
  - b. Tanks were generally employed as part of infantry-tank teams in which tanks led and were followed by infantry at a distance of 20-30 yards. As enemy resistance was encountered, combined infantry-tank action was used to eliminate it. Due to the enemy's lack of effective antitank weapons, this method proved successful. In the difficult terrain of the northwestern part of the island, it was impossible to take advantage of the mobility of tanks and they were employed essentially as point blank artillery. As engineers constructed roads, tanks were used similar to mobile pillboxes. Tanks were often used by infantry units on the perimeter of the night defensive position.
4. Route Reconnaissance: Very little was encountered in the way of AF mines or defenses; however, on two occasions tanks were disabled by AT mines or friendly duds on routes which had not been reconnoitered.

5. Liaison:

- a. The infantry-tank liaison procedure used in this operation was developed at Oahu. Each platoon of tanks was represented by a five-man liaison team composed of 3 EM (tank) equipped with one SCR

509 radio to establish liaison with the supported infantry CP and two EM (Inf) equipped with SCR 536 radios, each to accompany one section of tanks. Each infantry platoon was prepared to furnish one EM to work with each SCR 536 radio operator in designating targets to tanks. Communications between tanks and infantry liaison teams was by 536 radios with which tanks of platoon and section leaders were equipped. An auxiliary means of communication was by sound power telephone attached to the rear of each medium tank. Communications between the tank platoon leader and the supported infantry CP was by SCR 509.

b. This system of liaison proved to be quite effective. SCR 536 radios worked satisfactorily. SCR 509 radios were very satisfactory and were used on several occasions to direct the fire of the entire tank unit from the infantry CP. Soundpower phones were used to a considerable extent. It was also found that when under fire the user would generally fail to replace the phone in the box provided for it, with the result that the phones were torn loose and run over by tanks. In addition to the mechanical means of liaison, direct personal contact was used to some extent, particularly with tanks having pistol ports.

6. Maintenance: Preparations for night defense did not always allow necessary time for maintenance and resupply of tanks prior to darkness. Resupply was generally accomplished just after daybreak and prior to the resumption of the attack.

#### H - LIAISON

1. Each RCT established officer liaison with Division Hqs on Fox Day when RCT liaison officers reported with the latest ground situation to Division Hqs afloat. These officers were used to carry important dispatches and orders to their commanders.
2. Division liaison officers were detailed for duty with RCTs in order to maintain continuous two-way liaison. These officers joined RCTs to which assigned at Guadalcanal and remained with them throughout the operation. They furnished Division Hqs with reports on activities of enemy and friendly troops. These reports were in addition to the regular combat and periodic reports furnished by RCTs.
3. Officer liaison between Division and higher headquarters was maintained by an officer detailed by III PhibCorps to remain with the Division. This officer functioned essentially in the same manner as Division liaison officers to RCTs.

## I - INFANTRY TACTICS

1. Regimental Combat Teams landed with two Battalion Landing Teams abreast, each BLT in a column of companies. The decision to land in this formation was made to facilitate control after landing since the plan of maneuver called for a rapid expansion of the beachhead laterally.

2. Destruction of the enemy consisted of the elimination of a succession of strongpoints, pillboxes, blockhouses, caves, and sniper groups. The terrain and thick underbrush encountered initially made it unwise to deploy small units on a broad front because of loss of control. It was generally impossible to approach enemy coastal fortifications except by using armored D-8 bulldozers to cut trails through the thick jungle growth to enable tanks and infantry to come within assault distance.

3. Conventional methods were employed in reducing man-made fortifications. A base of fire was established to cover the movement of flamethrower and demolition teams which closed in to destroy such structures. Destruction had to be complete, since enemy patrols would infiltrate, rebuild, and reoccupy the position. Excellent results were obtained by attacking pillboxes from the rear as enemy weapons were generally sited to cover limited avenues of approach.

### 4. Reduction of Cave Areas:

a. The defenses in the high ground of the northwest sector of the island were built around innumerable caves and crevices in difficult terrain already described herein in the Introduction and Narration. Some of these caves were improved by the Japanese garrison forces and fitted into the scheme of the island defensive system. A number of caves were man-made and cut into the bases of cliffs of solid rock, enabling them to withstand any amount and any type of bombardment.

b. Although no definite pattern of cave defense could be ascertained, it was apparent that considerable skill was used by the Japanese defenders in occupying and organizing many caves that were mutually supporting. As though to vary the plan of defense, many caves were defended which offered little in the way of fields of fire and appeared to be intended primarily to hold up the advance of the attacker and exact the maximum toll. Others served to cover a defile and afforded the occupants no choice but to fight to the death, since they were so situated as to preclude any chance to withdraw or escape.

c. The underbrush made it practically impossible to recognize caves until troops were actually upon them. Even after the foliage had been stripped away, it was not easy to distinguish between the opening of a cave and the shadow cast by a ground projection.

upon a jagged back round of white coral rock. Cave entrances were located with difficulty from airplane photographs, from prisoners of war, and from ground reconnaissance.

d. Techniques for the reduction of cave defenses in the type of terrain encountered had to be devised to meet the situations as they arose. The mechanical advantages we held over the Japanese defenders in open terrain were nullified to a large extent in the combat at close quarters in terrain over which no vehicles could pass. The usual method of establishing a base of fire had little effect, inasmuch as caves were generally not in the line of fire of supporting weapons, except at extremely short range. In general the measures adopted were -

- (1) A tight perimeter defense was placed around the entire area to prevent attempt by the enemy to escape.
- (2) Strong combat patrols were dispatched to seek out the enemy and destroy him.
- (3) Caves encountered were reduced by frontal attack, envelopment, or isolation with subsequent seige or assault.
- (4) Whenever possible artillery fire or napalm bombs was used to strip foliage and blast away protective aprons of rock.
- (5) Bulldozer roads were cut through areas of coral pinnacles to bring supporting tanks to within point blank range of many caves into which they fired with HE and WP.
- (6) In most situations when supporting weapons could not be used to advantage or at all, because of the small area of combat, the infantry attacked, supported only by rifle and BAR fire, using WP and fragmentation grenades, flamethrowers, demolitions, 4.2 WP shells especially prepared with a detonator in place of the regular fuze, and molotov cocktails. By this procedure destruction of the enemy was certain, but at times it was costly. Some caves were so situated that they could be stormed only from the front. An effective method for the reduction of such caves was to attack with grenades and followed immediately by close-in BAR and M-3 pistol fire.
- (7) Siege tactics were also employed in combatting the enemy hiding in caves which could be approached only through a defile well covered by fire from within the cave. Ambushes were prepared with food and water as bait, and containers wired with booby traps or covered by riflemen in wait for the Jap to venture forth. This method was slow, but most effective in reducing the enemy's strength with light casualties to our troops.

5. A systematic destruction of many natural caves along the shore line had to be instituted in order to prevent their occupation by the stray Japanese who managed to infiltrate through our lines in spite of the efforts made to confine them. Very heavy charges of explosives were required to cause the desired effect.

6. Advance through open country was usually by infantry-tank teams. Tanks preceded infantry by 20-50 yards. When enemy resistance was encountered infantry moved up and assisted by tanks eliminated the resistance.

7. Reconnaissance in force into enemy territory was the usual means by which the main enemy forces could be found. Constant harrassing sniper fire from infiltrated groups would often mislead small reconnaissance patrols into believing that they were in contact with large enemy forces.

8. Sniper-observer teams, each composed of two men, were effective in locating enemy snipers. A definite area of responsibility was assigned each team for continuous observation. Snipers usually disclosed their positions by movement. Anti-sniper teams composed of two M-1 riflemen each were employed to destroy any snipers discovered.

9. Perimeter defenses were established by all units during the night and movement was kept to the absolute minimum. During the latter stages of the operation some night patrols were used. Combat patrols were used to seize limited objectives during hours of darkness that were difficult to reach during hours of daylight. Night patrols also were used to retrieve friendly dead who were inaccessible during daylight because of enemy fire.

#### G - SUPPLY

1. Unloading Plan: The original unloading plan contemplated a completely controlled unloading, due to the necessity for early reembarkation. The cancellation of Phase II and the scheduled use of the shipping for another operation caused the abandonment of plans for controlled unloading and made it necessary to unload everything with utmost speed. In order to insure the proper priority of supplies and avoid congestion of supplies on the beaches during the assault phase, the Division G-4 was placed aboard the Primary Control Vessel with G-4 representatives on the Trans Div Control Vessels. The Asst G-4 remained aboard the flagship with the Division Staff. A balanced unloading schedule had been developed during the rehearsals and was used in the operation. In each landing craft there was placed 2 cans

of water, two cases of rations, and assorted small-arms ammunition. Assault Troops were to carry these from the boats to the beach above the high-water line. They were to serve as a reserve until the shore party landed and supplies began to arrive.

2. Conduct of the Unloading: For the first two days there was a balanced unloading of Classes I, III, V, eliminating requests from the beaches for materials. This continued until stock levels were well up, then general unloading was initiated. On Beach Red, RCT 322 concentrated on two APAs, unloading them 60% in the first two days. As the beach was developed, the third APA and AKA were brought in for unloading. In general, the same procedure was followed on Beach Blue. Eighty per cent of all supplies and equipment were unloaded in 3 days and unloading of all assault shipping was completed in 7 days. For the first 3 days supplies were unloaded much faster than the shore party could handle them. At times the beaches became congested so that no accurate records could be maintained; some lack of control of unloading also resulted, as well as loss of supplies and equipment. Control was sacrificed for speed. Even so, very creditable results were attained by shore party and other personnel engaged in unloading.

3. Combat Supply Activities: By noon of Fox plus one, shore party battalions had control of all beach dumps. On the morning of Fox plus three the regimental supply sections assumed control of all installations and began to issue only through battalion S-4's. At 1200, Fox plus three, the Division Shore Party supply agencies began to inventory supplies and became familiar with their appropriate installations. The O-1 line became the rear boundary for RCTs, and beaches and rear areas were taken over by Division. At 1600 Division supply services assumed control over supply installations and made issues from dumps. Operation of all installations had to be continued with RCT personnel, since the major parties of Division service troops had not been landed. On Fox plus 4, some service troops were landed and with the aid of shore party labor began operation of all dumps. The Division Ammunition Section was reinforced with one Infantry A&P Platoon, but this proved unsatisfactory. The regiment had need of its A&P Platoon; moreover, the number of men was not sufficient for the task. The platoon was released and the attempt to collect and stock ammunition abandoned. Sufficient personnel were not available who were experienced in handling various types of ammunition, with the result that different types were mixed and the inventorying and consolidation of ammunition into dumps was delayed. Sufficient personnel were not available initially for moving chemical warfare supplies. Dumps had to be established close to both beaches, under the control of the Division Chemical Supply Officer, assisted by shore party personnel.

4. Permanent Dumps: On Fox plus 5, plans were made for the movement of supplies to permanent dump areas. The execution of the plan was delayed due to the continued presence of the enemy and the lack of

sufficient transportation. It was later decided not to move dumps from the vicinity of the beaches until bivouac areas had been assigned to all units. Many of the locations which had been selected from the map prior to the landing proved unsuitable for bivouac or dumps.

5. Salvage Activities: Salvage activities during the first few days were not too satisfactory. The Division Salvage Officer and a small detachment accomplished all salvage during this period. This consisted of the evacuation or destruction of enemy ammunition and ration dumps, and the collection of all salvageable American materials. Several large ordnance pieces were evacuated directly by the Division Ordnance.

6. Difficulties Encountered:

a. In order to release shipping as quickly as possible, it was necessary to continue unloading during hours of darkness, a condition seriously affecting efforts to maintain perfect control.

b. Considerable loss of supplies resulted from pilfering before they reached the dump areas. Many Red Cross supplies, PX supplies, items of clothing did not reach the beach. Empty boxes which had formerly contained such supplies were unloaded from barges and LCTs. Beginning on Fox plus 1, a major problem was the pilfering of enemy and American abandoned equipment and supplies in forward areas by souvenir hunters from the beach area. A large portion of the souvenir hunters were crews of ships, craft, and barges. It became necessary to throw a cordon of guards around both beach areas and to patrol all roads to keep such personnel out of forward areas. That such conditions might prevail was known before the landing and all concerned were warned to provide necessary guards. Despite the precautions, control in the congested area of the narrow beaches under the trying conditions was very difficult. Shore-party military police were found to be not as satisfactory as Division Military Police of which there were too few, a condition that has been corrected at the time of writing this report by a substantial increase in T/O strength.

K - CIVIL AFFAIRS

1. Planning:

a. The Division Judge Advocate was designated Civil Affairs Officer and authorized to use his section consisting of two officers, one warrant officer, and two enlisted men as assistants.

b. Intelligence information indicated that 1000 - 1500 civilians were present on Angaur, and it was estimated that approximately one-half that number would survive the operation. Emergency supplies of 3500 rations and 1000 gallons of water were loaded to last until captured stores or Garrison Force supply became available. A supply of Glass "X" clothing, baby bottles, and nipples were also included. By prearrangement with the Division Quartermaster all these supplies

were available on call. The Division Surgeon had sufficient personnel and medical supplies to furnish medical care for the expected number of civilians.

c. Prior to embarkation, conferences were held with members of the Garrison Force Civil Affairs Section for the purpose of coordinating activities during the assault phase with the permanent plan of the Garrison Force. It was agreed that the Garrison Force Civil Affairs Section would go ashore at the earliest possible date to assist the Division Civil Affairs Section.

## 2. Operations:

a. The Civil Affairs Section landed on Fox plus one. It contacted the Beach Party, established a suitable temporary stockade, arranged to draw rations and water, and made guards available.

b. On 1 October six civilians were taken into custody and evacuated through regular PW channels to the Division G-2 for immediate interrogation. They were released to the Division Civil Affairs Officer on the same date. Two of the internees required hospitalization, and since all six constituted a family group they were quartered under guard in the hospital for a period of two days. On 3 October the Garrison Force completed its permanent stockade, and the internees were turned over to the Garrison Force Commander.

c. During 8 - 9 October, 178 additional civilians were taken into custody and immediately released to the Garrison Force Civil Affairs Section.

d. A small supply of Japanese Army rations and blankets and negligible stores of civilian food was captured during the operation and given to the civilians for their use.

## 3. Historical Background:


a. The majority of the civilians who had formerly lived on Angaur were evacuated by the Japanese during the early air strikes against the Palau Islands. Those who remained retired to the caves in the northwest part of the island during the naval bombardment preceding the assault and remained there until taken into custody. The remnants of the Japanese garrison force prevented their surrender.

b. The interned civilians were Chamorros who had been brought to Angaur some years ago. At least one of the older ones spoke Japanese, considerable German and Spanish, and the Chamorro dialect. Many of the others spoke some Japanese and Spanish in addition to the Chamorro dialect. They had no racial customs which made their care difficult, ate army rations with gusto, and gladly accepted medical treatment. They were friendly, cooperative, and glad to be freed of Japanese control.

L - ENEMY DEVELOPMENTS

1. Defensive Installations:

a. In preparing the defense for Angaur the Japanese did not use any new types of emplacements or defensive construction. In some cases they had improved on techniques already used in other operations. In the construction and camouflage of pillboxes, gun emplacements, and covered shelters maximum use was made of natural materials including logs, rocks and sand. Many emplacements had overhead cover five and six feet thick. Limited amounts of concrete were used in areas where natural materials were absent or not plentiful. Railroad rails and ties were used in many shelters to supplement log construction and to reinforce concrete. One pillbox was constructed next to a hollow tree so that a sniper could go from the pillbox up into the tree without being seen. One small rifle or machine gun concrete emplacement had the firing slit so constructed as to give the maximum field of fire with a minimum of exposure. A top view is shown in the sketch.



b. The antitank ditches and barricades and antiboat obstacles were of conventional design. One innovation in antitank defense was the use of  $2\frac{1}{2}$ " manila hawsers and  $1\frac{1}{4}$ " steel cables stretched between trees or posts at a height to catch tanks on their turrets. Some railroad rails were also used for this purpose.

Numerous natural caves scattered throughout the island were utilized by the Japanese as shelters for both personnel and material. In many instances they had improved the caves by camouflaging openings and making their interior suitable for living quarters, command posts, communication centers and aid stations. In areas where the rock formation was suitable dugouts had been constructed to supplement the natural caves and were hollowed out into the sides of hills and cliffs. These dugouts provided covered gun positions as well as storage places for ammunition and food supplies. These caves and dugouts were concentrated in the rough, rugged terrain in the northwest area of the island, TAs 113 and 117.

2. Mines and Booby Traps:

a. Mines were not used extensively by the Japanese on Angaur. Some large naval mines were anchored off shore particularly in the Beach Blue area. No antiboat or antitank mines were used along the beaches. A few mines were found in the Middle Village area and some mines and crude booby traps were placed under the railroad rails and in the defile in TA 113 T. The antitank mines used were the tape-measure type.

b. A type of flame bottle found on the island and used as a booby trap had a friction type igniter which set off an oil mixture in the bottle when the cork was pulled. Another booby trap was a saki bottle placed under the arm of a dead Japanese soldier and fastened to a tape measure mine.

### 3. Tactics:

a. Japanese forces launched a coordinated counterattack the first night our troops were ashore. They withdrew to the high ground in the northwest corner of the island and took up positions in the caves, dug-outs, and crevices after their forces had suffered severe losses rather than launch their usual "banzai" charge or counterattack. From these positions they carried out extensive sniper activity which was supported the first few days by mortar fire and the fire of light artillery pieces and antitank guns until they were destroyed. Throughout the action the Japanese, for the most part moved their troops and conducted their patrolling during the hours of darkness.

### 4. Ordnance: Three items of ordnance found on Angaur are believed to be new developments.

a. Two 150mm mortars were found on Angaur and are believed to be a new type. It is of the conventional mortar design with base-plate, bipod, tube and sight, similar in construction to the Japanese 81mm and 90mm mortars. The tube is 67" in length. The firing pin in the base of the tube can be retracted and fired by a trigger mechanism or it can be left fixed and the shell is fired by striking the pin in the normal manner. The projectile's shape is that of a long tear drop with fins on the tapered end. A propellant comparable to the propellant charge of a 20mm shell is screwed into the base and six additional small, blue, oval propellant packages are placed between the fins. The markings consist of a black painted body with a 3/4" yellow band 5 7/8" back from the nose of the projectile. Also on the body are the following numerals in white - "18.12". The measurements of the projectile are as follows: overall length 29 3/8"; outer diameter at greatest point - 5 7/8" (150mm); tail fins - 5 3/8" long at top, 6 1/2" long at base; weight - 40-50 lbs (estimated). The fuze that is used is thought to be the same as that used in the 90mm mortar but this has not been verified. The fuze is instantaneous or 0.10 delay. Delay is accomplished by means of a delay pallet that can be inserted. The projectiles found are filled with what appears to be cast TNT.

b. A new type 75mm Japanese incendiary shell for use in the field piece was also found here. The projectile is painted white with a red circle and the Japanese letter "K" in the center of the circle. The lettering is black, and is followed by the numerals "18.7". The projectile is the same size as the regular 75mm regimental gun, Model 41. It apparently weighs the same as the ordinary projectile for this gun, but the propellant charge in the new case

is smaller. The overall length of the projectile and case is  $21\frac{1}{2}$ ". The brass case is  $11\frac{1}{2}$ " and the projectile itself is  $11\frac{1}{2}$ ". The  $3/8$ " copper band is  $1\frac{1}{2}$ " from base of projectile. The projectile breaks  $4\frac{3}{8}$ " back from the nose. The forward head screws off leaving a sealed copper cylinder in the rear and which is filled with an incendiary material. When exposed to air this material ignites and burns vigorously, giving off phosphorous fumes. The material appears to be a mixture of rosin, phosphorous and possibly aluminum powder. Care should be used in extracting and opening the copper cylinder because as the solid burns it liquifies and the liquid seeps down into the ground, burning for about 2 or 3 minutes. The explosive charge of the projectile consists of a long cylinder booster  $2\frac{1}{2}$ " long and 1" in diameter. There is also an explosive molded in the forward head of the shell. This is believed to be for the purpose of breaking open the copper cylinder of the incendiary element.

#### M - COMMUNICATIONS

##### 1. Operations Afloat:

a. A Division message center was in continuous operation aboard the USS Fremont (F) from 11 August until Fox plus 5. During this period the message center operated in the usual manner, except that inter-ship traffic was handled over naval communication systems. Within the ship, telephone communication was established to offices of the Commanding General and members of the Staff. In addition, a complete messenger service was maintained.

b. A series of command post exercises conducted while afloat served to acquaint Division communication personnel with naval communication procedure. The experience gained proved invaluable during the actual operation.

##### 2. Ship to Shore Operations:

a. Communications teams of BLTs and RCTs landed with their respective CPs. The advance echelon of the Division Signal Co landed on Beach Red at 0755, Fox plus 1. The remainder of the Company, less a detachment with the rear echelon afloat, landed on Fox plus 2 and 3. All Signal Co personnel were ashore by Fox plus 5.

b. Communication from ship to shore was continuous and was maintained by use of the ship's radio assigned to the Division. The Division SCR 399 with power unit PE 95 were mounted on a DUKW which was carried as deck cargo on the Headquarters Ship. One SCR 508, one SCR 608, and one spare BC-312 Receiver were installed in the HO-17 in addition to the regular SCR 399 equipment. These made it possible to guard any frequency within the Division, except the SCR 300 and SCR 536. The DUKW was landed with Division Headquarters on Fox plus 1.

c. In addition to the normal radio nets of an infantry division the following were established:

- (1) CG Liaison Net (SCR 510): This net included the CG, Asst Div Comdr, C/S, and RCT COs and was used to supplement the normal Division Command Net of SCR 193 and SCR 284.
- (2) G-2 Net (SCR 510): This net included the Division and Regimental S-2s and was used for the majority of intelligence reports.
- (3) G-4 Net (SCR 510): This net included the Division, Regimental, and Battalion S-4s and proved highly satisfactory in the handling of administrative traffic.

### 3. Operations Ashore:

a. The primary means of communication ashore was by wire. One construction team and detachment T & T Section landed with the advance echelon, Division Headquarters, and laid two trunk lines to connect the Division CP with that of RCT 322. A pocket of enemy resistance prevented the early installation of wire to RCT 321. Wire communication with RCT 321 was maintained initially by use of the JAS Co lateral trunk line connecting Beaches Red and Blue. One Division wire team was left with each RCT to extend Division trunk lines as RCTs displaced forward. Division Artillery communication personnel maintained wire to FA battalions.

b. All wire was laid overhead and off roads and trails, except where terrain and jungle growth were impassable to construction teams. Radio had to be resorted to frequently because of damage to wire circuits caused by bulldozers widening roads and clearing storage areas and artillery fields of fire.

c. Messenger service was used infrequently due to the satisfactory operation of electrical means of communication.

d. Cryptographic System M-209 was the principal cryptographic aid used within the Corps and subordinate units.

e. On Fox plus 10 the Construction Platoon and T & T section were reorganized to facilitate control and increase efficiency. All wire personnel were grouped into one platoon under control of the T & T Officer who was designated Wire Officer. Platoon Headquarters consisted of the Wire Chief who maintained records and issued all orders relative to wire construction and repair. The remainder of the Platoon was divided into two sections designated as inside and outside plant forces. The inside plant force consisted of SWB, teletype, and telegraph operators and was under the supervision of the Construction Officer. The outside plant force consisted of linemen and installer repairmen under the supervision of the Assistant Message Center Officer.

4. Supply: There was some loss of signal equipment which fell out of cargo nets during unloading. Division signal supplies were scattered in several dumps which made difficult replacement, repair, and resupply of such equipment.

5. Transportation: Vehicles were unloaded together with teams to which they were assigned. There was no failure of any item of motor equipment throughout the operation. During the planning phase it was necessary to reduce the number of vehicles, particularly of the heavy type, because of a lack of shipping space. This reduction seriously handicapped the performance of wire construction teams.

#### N - GARRISON FORCES

1. Organization: The following units, designated as Garrison Forces, were attached to the Division for the assault phase on Angaur:

a. Service Units:

405th Ord Co (MM)  
3d Plat 247th QM Depot Co  
3d Plat 722d Engr Depot Co  
2d Plat 3259th QM Serv Co  
290th Port Co  
104th Bomb Disposal Squad

b. Air Base:

1884th Engr Bn (Avn)  
1887th Engr Bn (Avn)

c. Defense Troops:

7th AAA Bn (USMC)

2. Mission: The Commanding General, 81st Infantry Division, was charged with the responsibility for the defense and development of Angaur Island during the assault phase. (\*) Upon completion of the assault phase and when directed by proper authority all responsibilities pertaining to command of Angaur, except defense, were to be relinquished to the Island Commander.

3. Operations:

a. Service Units: These units were attached to corresponding units of the Division. During the early part of the assault phase they assisted in the unloading of supplies and organization of the beach areas. On 22 September, after Angaur had been secured, all service units, except the 104th Bomb Disposal Squad, were relieved of attachment to the Division and assigned to Garrison Forces.

b. Air Base: The aviation engineers were used exclusively in the construction of the Angaur airfield and no demands were made on them by the Division for engineer work on roads, harbors, and the unloading of garrison supplies. Reconnaissance parties of the 1884 and 1887 Engr Bn (Avn) landed on Fox plus 2 to locate the airfield.

site. The following day survey parties began work on center line location. Clearing and grading of the airfield site began shortly thereafter. On Fox plus 28, the first plane, a C-47, landed on the field. Both battalions were relieved of attachment to the Division on 22 September and assigned to Garrison Force.

c. Defense Troops: A reconnaissance party of the 7 AAA Bn (USMC) landed on Fox plus 3. The unloading of equipment began on Fox plus 4. On Fox plus 7, the battalions reported into the Air Defense Control Command on Peleliu, the control center for the antiaircraft defense of the Southern Palau Islands. The Battalion was closely integrated in the Angaur Island defense plans, operating observation posts along the coast for waterborne targets in addition to being responsible for antiaircraft defense. The battalion first fired on enemy planes attacking Angaur Island on Fox plus 8.

d. On 14 Oct the Commanding General 81st Infantry Division was advised that the attack and occupation phase on Angaur Island was terminated as of 1200 that date. (\*\*) All responsibilities pertaining to the administration of the island, except those necessary for the accomplishment of the defense mission, were relinquished to the Commander Garrison Force. (\*\*\*) The 104 Bomb Disposal Squad and the 7 AAA Bn (USMC) were relieved of attachment to the Division and assigned to Garrison Forces. Operational control of the 7 AAA Bn (USMC) remained with the Division.

e. There was no enemy interference to the normal tasks of the Garrison Force throughout the operation, inasmuch as the enemy was contained in the combat zone in the NW part of the island.

#### 4. Comments:

a. The type, number, or composition of the Garrison Force was generally adequate. Some delay in the landing of supplies, equipment, and personnel of the Garrison Forces was caused by unusual weather conditions. This resulted in delay in the execution of the Island Development Plan and complications in the supply problem.

b. Close liaison was maintained throughout the operation, between commanders and staffs of the Division and Garrison Force.

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(\*) CINCPAC and CINCPOA Top Secret Ltr, serial 000632, 7 Aug 1944, Subject: Base Development Plan - Domestic.

(\*\*) Despatch 141331, Hq III PhibCorps.

(\*\*\*) Col Ray A. Dunn.

O - ENGINEER

a. - General

1. Engineer troops involved in operations on Angaur consisted of the following:

Organic Engineer Component

306 Engr (C) Bn

Attached Engineer Troops

1138th Engr (C) Gp with the 52d and 154th Engr (C) Bns.

1884th and 1887th Engr Bns Avn

3d Plat 722d Engr Depot Co

2. A report of the shore party work of the 1138th Engr (C) Gp has been prepared separately and is included in "A", this Section. The aviation battalions operated independently of other engineer troops. The 3d Plat 722d Engr Depot Co assisted in supply activities prior to embarkation and after arrival at Angaur.
3. Immediately after arrival of the 306 Engr (C) Bn and the 1138 Engr (C) Gp in Oahu, equipping of these units was initiated, and the engineer supplies required for the assigned task were received and prepared for shipment. Although operational plans were changed slightly after embarkation, the basic plans and logistics proved sound.

b. Organic Engineer Component

1. Mission:

- a. The 306 Engr (C) Bn was given the mission of supporting RCTs and other components of the reinforced Division in the forward areas.

b. The priority of engineer tasks was:

- (1) Removal of beach and inland obstacles impeding the forward movement of troops.
- (2) Construction and maintenance of roads and trails.
- (3) Assault of fortified localities.

2. Organization: To accomplish the mission as set forth above, the battalion was organized as follows:

- a. One line platoon with first-aid man was attached to each BLT. Line company headquarters accompanied RCT Hq.
- b. One water unit operating section from H&S Co was assigned each line company headquarters. The remainder of H&S Co was kept intact. One of its major tasks was the operation of the Division engineer supply.

c. Combat Engincoor Equipment

1. Engincoors:

a. The following excess equipment was taken by the 306 Engr (C) Bn:

- 9 - D-8 Tractors with LeTourneau cable operated angledozers and armored cab. One D-8 bulldozer was assigned each platoon.
- 1 - Rooter. Assigned to H&S Co.
- 1 - Motorized Grader - Galion 101. Assigned to H&S Co.
- 1 - T-9, 2 ton Crawler Crane. Assigned to H&S Co.

b. All T/E equipment was taken, except 1 air compressor, assault boats, and 8 pole trailers which were left behind because of lack of shipping space.

2. Vehicles: A total of 60, distributed as follows:

<u>Truck</u>	<u>Ea Plat</u>	<u>Ea Co Hq</u>	<u>H&amp;S Co</u>	<u>Total</u>
1/4 Ton 4 x 4 w/odograph			1	1
1/4 Ton 4 x 4		1	3	6
3/4 Ton 4 x 4 WC		1	1	4
2-1/2 Ton 6 x 6 Dump	1	2	3	18
4 Ton 6 x 6 Wrecker			1	1

Special Engincoor

Compressor, Air	3	3
Shop, Motorized	1	1
Tractor, D-4, w/bulldozer	3	3

Amphibious Vehicles

DUKW	1	1	10
M-29C		1	3

Trailers

1 ton 2-wheel Cargo	1		3
250 gal water trailer	1	1	4
2-wheel pole-type 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -T		2	2
Special trailer for welding equipment		1	1

3. Weapons: The following were provided in addition to current T/E:

a. 27 BAR's, one for each squad.

b. 22 Submachine, cal .45, M-3, for heavy equipment operators.

c. 9 Gun, Machine, Browning, cal. .30, M 1918 A7, one for each platoon.

4. Signal: The following were provided in addition to current T/E:

- a. 27 SCR 536 radios which were distributed 3 per platoon.
- b. 11 SCR 625 Metallic Mine Detectors making a total of 26 available to the battalion.
- c. 9 AN PRS-1 Non-Metallic Mine Detectors, or one per platoon.

5. Chemical: Each platoon was provided with three M2-2 Flame Throwers and one flame thrower service kit, the latter to be used in conjunction with infantry. Fifteen flame throwers were retained by H&S Co as Division reserve stock.

6. Quartermaster: As for other troops of the Division.

7. Comments:

a. Bulldozers: Commercial Caterpillar D-8 with cab of  $\frac{1}{2}$ " armor steel, steel A frame for use on rear, and a special block bracket permitting the dozer to be landed in an LCM-3 without removing the blade and to be in operation about 10 minutes after landing. (See Figure 1, P 104)

b. Rooter: Conventional heavy duty type. Was very useful in ripping up coral rock which was found on two-thirds of the island, and was used extensively in road work and airstrip construction. It has saved many man hours of labor and many pounds of explosives.

c. T-9 Crawler: Was used extensively in the engineer dump for loading and unloading of engineer supplies.

d. Grader: Proved very successful in shaping up and maintaining roads in rear areas, relieving dozers for more important work. The battalion should be equipped with two.


e. Odograph: An invaluable aid in accurately locating roads.

f.  $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton 4 x 4 Truck: Invaluable for bringing small supplies of demolitions to the front. The four with H&S Co were used for reconnaissance section in addition to land odograph, one for the Div Engr Section, and two for the battalion command section.

g. 3/4-ton 4 x 4 Truck: Used with 3/4-ton trailer to transport water purification equipment.

h.  $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton Dump Truck: Used successfully for resupply of platoons and were too busy to handle any road material whatsoever.

i. 4 Ton Wrecker: Was essential in the expeditious repair of heavy equipment in front line areas.



DETAIL OF BRACKET  
welded to lower  
part of blade, to en-  
able blade to be raised  
to required height.

SUPPORTING ARM to  
retain ends of yoke  
at proper height.




FIGURE NO. 1

j. Air Compressor: Was used during the early stages of the operation in the combat zone preparing holes for demolitions.

k. Motorized Shop Truck: Was used to make parts for the grader and large tractors. This proved to be an indispensable part of the battalion's equipment.

l. Welding Trailer: Was used in conjunction with the motorized shop in building up broken parts prior to machining down for use and for emergency repair work. It is essential in any type operation.

m. Amphibious Truck 2½ Ton 6x6: Used to bring in initial supplies to each assault platoon, after which trucks reverted to control of DUKW Co. The 2½ ton dump truck would be better if it could be landed in time. If DUKWs are used, they should remain under the control of the engineer platoon leaders.

n. M-29C Cargo Carrier: Was used for supply. Could very easily be replaced by the  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton 4 x 4 unless the terrain was known to be swampy.

o. Pole Trailers: Have not been used, due to lack of local sources of timber.

p. One-Ton Trailer: Used to carry water purification equipment of each RCT.

q. Flame Thrower: Was very effective in assaulting pillboxes and caves. In most cases engineer platoons operated flamethrower servicing and refueling points in conjunction with the platoon supply dumps. Safety valves should be strengthened to blow off at a pressure of 500 pounds per sq in. The pressure regulator control valve failed to operate properly after 4 or 5 services. A fuel shut off valve should be placed on the fuel outlet pipe just behind the flexible hose connection. The safety lock on the flexible hose connection should be made of spring steel, as the present type is not strong enough. A retaining chain should be fastened to the nozzle to prevent its loss upon removal. NaPalm thickener fuel consisting of 4% NaPalm by weight to a mixture of 75% gasoline and 25% light Diesel fuel has proved to be very effective. Many instances were reported where fuel has deteriorated due to the entrance of moisture. However, in most cases the fuel was found to operate effectively after having been prepared two months previously.

#### 8. Summary of Operation:

a. Immediately after landing, assault companies began work on the reduction of embankments on Beaches Red and Blue to allow passage of LVTs and tanks to the first phase line.

b. Engineer troops were used in the assault of fortified positions throughout the assault phase of the operation.



FIGURE N° 2  
ROAD CONSTRUCTION  
ANGAUR OPERATION  
Map: ANGAUR ISLAND  
SCALE 1/20,000

DISTRIBUTION OF  
ROADS COMPLETED

10,900 YDS. + 2,350 YDS.  
9,350 YDS. + 3,700 YDS.

4,250 YDS. + 5,200 YDS.

306 ENGR. 1138 GP.

LEGEND:

— COMBAT ROADS

— COMBAT ROADS IMPROVED TO 2 TRACK ON FOX + 18

— ROADS CONSTRUCTED OUTSIDE COMBAT AREA  
AFTER INITIAL ASSAULT PHASE

c. Road construction was carried on concurrently with the advance, and supply roads were pushed as close as possible to front-line troops. Road work was very difficult through the dense jungle undergrowth and coral rock, and heavy equipment had to be supplemented with explosives. The tremendous amount of work involved in road construction makes it advisable that infantry troops and artillery troops service secondary paths and trails with tools available in the battalion. See Figure No. 2, Page 108, for the status of the road system on Angaur up to Fox plus 18.

d. There was no extensive use of land mines by the enemy. The only successful use of such mines was in the defile leading into the large basin in the northwest part of the island, which resulted in the disablement of several tracked vehicles.

d. - Attached Engineers

1. 1138th Engineer Combat Group:

a. The 155th Engr (C) Bn remained with RCT 323 in Corps Reserve and was not employed on Angaur. On Fox plus 5, the 154th Engr (C) Bn (less one company) departed with the 321st Inf for Peleliu.

b. In addition to shore party work, the attached combat engineers gave valuable assistance in reinforcing the 306th Engr (C) Bn. On Fox Day, before unloading of supplies began on a large scale, construction of a lateral road connecting Beaches Red and Blue was initiated by battalions working towards each other. This road was completed on Fox plus 1. After completion of principal shore party functions, these units were used for construction and maintenance of roads, development of beach and supply installations, and Saipan Town boat basin.

c. Bulldozers and personnel from the attached combat battalions assisted in clearing numerous areas for dumps, bivouacs, hospital installations, and cemetery.

d. In several instances, elements of the 52d Engr (C) Bn and 154th Engr (C) Bn were engaged in active combat, routing Japanese out of isolated caves, repulsing local counterattacks, and reducing pillboxes.

e. The staff of the 1138th Engr (C) Gp rendered valuable assistance to the Division Engineer in reconnaissance, planning, and surveys for combat and island development projects.

2. 1884th and 1887th Engineer Battalions (Aviation): These battalions accompanied the Division for the purpose of constructing an airfield. On Fox plus 2 reconnaissance parties were landed. On the

following day survey parties began center line construction. Control of the work was given to the Island Engineer. The first planes (C-47s) began using the field on Fox plus 28.

3. 3d Platoon, 722d Engineer Depot Company: Assisted with engineer supplies.

e. Engineer Supply Activities

1. General: The 306th Engr (C) Bn battalion supply section was augmented by officers and enlisted men of the 306th Engr (C) Bn, 1138th Engr (C) Gp and the 3d Platoon, 722d Engineer Depot Co. All requisitioning, preparation of shipping tickets, operation of storage yard, distribution and issue, and delivery from depots to piers was accomplished by this section.

2. Water Supply:

a. The Administrative Order directed that a 5-day supply be embarked with troops, based on 2 gallons per man per day. Approximately 20,000 - 5 gallon cans and 2,200 - 55 gallon drums were cleaned, filled with chlorinated water, painted, and marked. The chlorine content of the water was maintained with  $2\frac{1}{2}$  parts per million during the filling operations. The filling of water containers was one of the final operations in preparation for embarkation. The pallets of 5 gallon cans and 55 gallon drums were distributed among the various ships transporting troops according to the plans of the RCT TQMs. In certain cases a reserve was placed on the AKAs; in others each ship carried 10 gallons per man. Each man going ashore carried 2 filled canteens from the ships water supply. The unloading of water began on Fox Day and at no time was there any lack of water for the troops.

b. On Fox plus 2 two cisterns were found containing some 150,000 gallons of fresh water. On Fox plus 4 a portable chlorination section was set up, and water issue started from these cisterns. This supply was exhausted on Fox plus 18. On Fox plus 3 the initial distillation unit was placed in operation; and on Fox plus 8, 60,000 gallon capacity of distillation units were in operation, equally distributed between Beaches Red and Blue. Due to rough seas, suction line difficulties prevented units from operating at full capacity.

c. Other sources of water consisted of three lakes in the northwest corner of the island and wells found in the southern half of the island. It was impossible to establish any water points on the lakes, due to combat conditions which lasted until Fox plus 16. On Fox plus 18 six distillation units were moved adjacent to one of the lakes and began operation.

### 3. Explosives and Demolition Accessories:

- a. Preliminary studies of the island indicated that a large supply of explosives would be required. Approximately 35% was palletized and placed on BLT transports. A small supply of loose cases was also furnished BLTs, but the major portion was stowed on AKAs.
- b. An initial supply of explosives was provided each assault platoon of the 306 Engr (C) Bn and preloaded in DUKWs assigned to each platoon.
- c. Except for the water-proofed demolition accessories on pallets and a small stock of unbroken packages, all stocks of blasting caps and accessories were divided and packed in standard boxes. This was done in order that all items would be available when desired and to eliminate the possibility of loss of certain items by leaving them in the original containers. The box was painted red, marked on the outside, and provided with a large water-proof envelope. Items such as blasting caps and primacord were packed in separate containers within the larger box.
- d. Explosives and demolition accessories from standard boxes on BLT APAs were furnished engineer and infantry assault troops prior to debarkation. Each engineer soldier carried ashore two demolition packs and designated infantrymen carried one demolition pack. Special shockproof containers were provided for blasting caps carried by individuals.

### 4. Heavy Equipment:

- a. For tabulation of equipment carried by Divisional and attached engineers, refer to Heavy Equipment Table, Page III.
- b. Necessary accessories were provided such as A frames for hoists on tractors, slings, snatch blocks, and double blocks. Armored cabs were installed on the D-8 tractors used by the 306th Engr (C) Bn.
- c. A supply of repair parts amounting to 150,000 lbs for Divisional and attached units was received and packed for shipment.

### 5. Class II Supply:

- a. The 30 day block of resupply amounting to 144,000 lbs was based on requirements obtained from previous operations. This was broken down into four parts. Three identical lots of certain items were prepared and one furnished each RCT. The major portion was retained by the BSO for divisional stock. The combat team lots were issued to RCTs for shipment, while the divisional lot was carried by the 306th Engr (C) Bn BSO.

b. Conclusions: Certain items such as explosives and Class IV material should be omitted from the initial resupply block because they get mixed with the initial issue and are lost as resupply. It is not possible to determine the adequacy of the Class II resupply as no issue has been made to cover the division losses.

#### 6. Class IV Supply:

##### a. Fortification:

(1) The total amounts of fortification materials provided were as follows:

Wire, barbed	750 rolls
Pickets, short	9900 each
Pickets, long	4450 each
Sand bags	223000 each

(2) Some units provided each truck with concertinas and sand bags.

##### b. Construction and Sanitation Supplies:

(1) The following construction and sanitation supplies and equipment were provided for the improvement of bivouac conditions after the initial combat phase:

Nails - various sizes	400 kegs
(Approximately 40% more palletized)	
Latrine boxes (8 hole)	200 each
Fly traps	400 each
Burlap, 30" wide	10,000 lin.ft.
Pipe, salvaged, 1 $\frac{1}{4}$ to 2" diameter	800 lin.ft.
Pumping and Chlorination Units	20
Shower units (fittings and pipe for 32 head battalion units were assembled and packed by BSO)	30
Sprayers - Knapsack	200 each
Dusters	14 each
Paris Green	1400 lbs

(2) An effort was made to salvage dunnage and stock it in the engineer supply dump for construction after the assault phase, but only a small amount was received.

7. Engineer Supply after Assault Landing: All engineer supply was handled initially by the RCTs with the assistance of the attached organic engineer companies. On Fox plus 1 control passed to the shore party battalions. On Fox plus 3 Division took control of the supply agencies. Division immediately located the engineer dump at a point between Beaches Red and Blue. Clearing and construction was started on five dispersed trenches for the storage of explosives, along with two pits for storage of caps and accessories. The 3rd Platoon of the 722d Depot Co arrived on Fox plus 4, and was attached for duty with the organic engineer battalion BSO operating the engineer dump. Parties were organized to locate and gather all engineer equipment and supplies on the beaches; and by Fox plus 5, this had been accomplished.

### HEAVY EQUIPMENT TABLE

Distribution of Heavy Equipment supplied 306th Engr Bn, 1138 Engr Group  
Combat Bns, and 81 Division Artillery.

	306th Engr Division	Combat Bn	Total
	Bn	Arty	1138 Gp

#### Tractors with Bulldozers

D-8	9	5	14
D-7		21	21
D-6		15	15
D-4	3 *	27	30
HD-14	3		3
R-4	9		9
 Total Tractors	 12	 12	 68
Winch, 5-ton, w/1000' cable		3	3
Lubricators, Truck mounted		2	2
Crane, crawler, T-9, 2-ton Cap.	1	9	10
Crane, M-20		3	3
Crane, $\frac{1}{2}$ yd - Bucyrus-Erie, w/shovel and attachments		6	6
Electric Light Set - 5 KW	3		3
Floodlight Units - 5 KW		18	18
Ice Maker, gas-driven, 2000 lbs day Capacity		3	3
 Distillation Units:			
50,000 gal per day cap.		16	16
2,500 gal per day cap.		8	8
Water Purification Units **	1	3	4
Carryall - 8 cu.yd.		1	1
Grader, motorized	1	2	3
Rooter	1		1
Saw, Chain, Gas engine-driven **	3	9	12

Note: \* 3 - D-4 Tractors were issued to the 306th Engr Bn as T/E equipment. The 3 - R-4 Tractors from the 306th Engr Bn and 6 - R-4 Tractors from the Group Battalions were reissued to the Light F.A. Bns.

\*\* Issued the combat engineer battalions in excess of that authorized by T/E.

P. - MEDICAL

1. Attachments: The attachments of medical troops to RCTs and Division Troops was as follows:

RCT 321: Co A, 306 Med Bn  
Co D (less 2d Plat), 306 Med Bn  
Hq 306 Med Bn (less Det)

RCT 322: Co B, 306 Med Bn  
17 Field Hosp (less 1 Plat)

RCT 323: (Employed at Ulithi)  
Co C, 306 Med Bn  
2d Plat Co D, 306 Med Bn  
Det Hq 306 Med Bn

Div Trs: 1 Plat, 17 Field Hosp  
41 Port Surg Hosp

Based on experience in the operation, the 41st Portable Surgical Hospital could have been utilized better as a clearing platoon for RCT 322 and the 17th Field Hospital kept intact under Division control.

2. Operations: Medical troops rendered very satisfactory support in the treatment and evacuation of the wounded. During the early stages of combat evacuation from the beaches to ships was slow due to a shortage of landing craft. Feeding of the wounded was generally unsatisfactory because of a lack of sufficient quantities of convalescent food. Losses among medical personnel were high, largely because they exposed themselves too much in attempting to reach and treat the wounded. Japanese snipers would often wait until aid men reached the wounded before opening fire.

3. Statistics: Statistics for the period 17 September - 30 October inclusive is as follows:

	<u>BATTLE</u>		<u>NON-BATTLE</u>			<u>Battle</u>
	Wounded	Injured	Disease	Injured	Fatigue	
Received from units	1049	305	576	120	244	2294
Returned to duty	306	229	430	77	168	1292
Died of wounds	80	3	0	1	0	84
Killed in action	180	-	-	-	-	180
Evacuated	562	73	85	31	65	816
Remaining in						
39th Sta Hosp	11	7	61	12	11	102

## Q - SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS

### 1. Aerial Reconnaissance Mission - Photographic and Observation:

a. Aerial reconnaissance prior to Fox Day consisted of vertical and oblique photographs taken during the air strikes against Angaur in the period 31 March - 16 September inclusive. From a study of these photographs an accurate picture was gained of the enemy defenses. The results of this study are shown in Incl #1, Intelligence Map.

b. The pictures were generally good, although clouds made clear photographic coverage impossible. The greatest deficiency was the failure of photographs to cover the island. The Division was unable to secure good oblique coverage of the landing beaches and areas inland therefrom during the period Fox minus 30 to Fox Day.


c. From Fox Day to the end of the operation aerial reconnaissance consisted chiefly of observation missions executed by observers stationed on aircraft carriers and using Navy TBFs. The Division used six observers, four loaned by III PhibCorps and one from each of the assault combat teams. At least one of these observers was on station at all times during daylight hours and gave continuous information of enemy as well as friendly activity. During this period only one photographic mission was flown.

### 2. Surface Reconnaissance:

a. Submarine reconnaissance of Angaur was made prior to Fox Day. The chief information gained from this source was of beach and shoreline conditions. This data, along with other available information, formed the basis of the beach studies shown in Incl #2.

b. On Fox minus 2 and 3, underwater demolition teams made reconnaissance of Beaches Red, Blue, Green III, and Green II. Prior to leaving for the objective area, the Division G-2 and Navy Group One Intelligence Officer met with officers of these teams to brief them on Army and Navy requirements. They were instructed to look for all types of defensive works on the beaches and beach flanks with special attention to obstacles which might hinder the advance of troops and tanks inland. The teams reconnoitered close to shore and were able to observe and report a number of important installations.


c. No pre-landing ground reconnaissance was executed.



COMMENTS

\* \* AND \* \*

RECOMMENDATIONS



## SECTION XI

### COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Comments and recommendations made herein are based on the experiences in the Angaur Operation. Some of them are not necessarily applicable to operations conducted under a different set of conditions and circumstances.

#### A - SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT

1. Tanks, bulldozers, and emergency supplies should be kept in a rendezvous area in the vicinity of the beach control vessel to be available as soon as they are needed.
2. Bulldozers were landed in the leading waves and this is very important to facilitate unloading, clearing of beaches and dump areas, and movements inland of combat troops.

#### B - SHORE PARTY OPERATIONS

1. The present shore party organization is considered sound and no changes are recommended.
2. The time spent in developing beach and lateral roads prior to the general unloading phase pays dividends in greater hourly tonnage that the beach is able to handle thereafter.
3. Causeways and piers should be installed for the use of cranes and trucks so that cargo can be handled in cargo nets direct to trucks. This should be done at the earliest possible moment, and not later than D plus 2. Cranes were used to great advantage at the shore line for unloading heavy loose cargo from barges and LCTs.
4. Steel sand sleds, towed by small dozers, are very useful for handling loose cargo.
5. Floating supply dumps were very successful in that any type of ammunition could be called in and unloaded in a very short time.
6. LCTs and DUKWs should be refueled from a floating supply so as not to congest the beach or dump areas.
7. Shore party police must be selected officers and men, well indoctrinated with responsibilities and with the fortitude to enforce rules of the beach, particularly those forbidding pilfering, requiring sanitation, preventing firing of weapons except at the enemy, and controlling traffic. In enforcement of regulations no individual will be excused no matter what his rank, grade, or branch of service.

8. Shore party engineer battalions should be placed under group control, under division, as early as practicable, provided that more than one battalion is ashore in the same general area.
9. Shore party engineer battalion headquarters should be given full and complete control of all troops and supplies in the beach area after the combat troops have cleared the beach of the enemy.

#### C - NAVAL GUNFIRE

1. Naval gunfire teams now assigned to each infantry battalion would function more efficiently if the present organization were changed from one Naval Liaison Team and one Naval Gunfire Spotter Team to two Spotter Teams. One team should remain at the battalion command post to advise the battalion commander while the other controls the fire. The teams could then be alternated to give men a chance to rest. In an emergency two teams could be available for simultaneous use.
2. The SCR 284 radios used by the observer and spotter parties ashore were not very satisfactory. They required too much time to set up, were heavy and awkward to carry, and could be used only from concealed and dug-in positions, as the operator of the hand generator would be otherwise exposed. At night, communications were difficult as the noise of the generator drew enemy fire.

#### D - AIR SUPPORT

1. Air liaison parties of adjacent regiments must check with each other on locations of friendly troops before requesting missions that may possibly endanger friendly troops.
2. WP is at times unsuited for designating air targets. Pilots can and do mistake the use of WP by one unit as a target designation by an adjacent unit. If WP is used for target designation, its use must be prohibited behind friendly advanced elements.

#### E - ARTILLERY EMPLOYMENT

1. Even though the light artillery battalions are usually parts of regimental combat teams in an amphibious operation, they should be placed under the centralized control of the Division Artillery Commander at the earliest possible time, provided of course that more than one battalion is in the operation and in the same general area.
2. For early observation, artillery liaison planes should be provided operational space on a carrier. Without this no artillery observation is available initially. This observation is invaluable.
3. The use of one medium tank per light artillery battalion for forward OPs proved of distinct value.

#### F - TANKS - EMPLOYMENT

1. Where the infantry desires fire on obscure targets, it is well to place in the bow gunner's position an infantryman who knows the exact location of the target in order that he may designate it with tracers fired from the tank's machine gun.
2. A heavy spring holder should be developed for the sound-power phone mounted on the outside of the tank for communication with the tank crew. It should be mounted low on the tank to allow infantrymen to crawl under the tank where some cover from enemy fire exists.
3. Tanks should be placed well within the infantry defensive perimeter and assigned such fields of fire as are available. Routes forward can be reconnoitered over which tanks can move to provide close support as necessary.
4. Tanks must have at least one hour for maintenance prior to darkness in addition to the time required for refueling and resupply. For short operations maintenance may be partially or entirely omitted; when the operation lasts for more than a few days, maintenance must be accomplished daily if vehicles are to continue to be in a serviceable condition.
5. The battalion reconnaissance platoon should provide a team to each tank attachment to aid infantry in making reconnaissance of tank routes.
6. The battalion supply and maintenance sections must be landed early to service tanks. Units to which tanks are attached generally fail to furnish necessary fuel and ammunition.

#### G - INFANTRY OPERATIONS

1. Allotment of two Browning automatic rifles to each rifle squad is sound.
2. In operations of this type 37mm gun is suitable for battalion anti-tank platoons.
3. Heavy machine gun with light machine gun tripod is excellent in offensive operations.
4. In jungle and cave warfare, flame throwers are invaluable. Long range type used in this operation in LVTs should be placed in a vehicle with armor approaching in type that of the medium tank. Tanks equipped with bulldozer blades are invaluable in jungle warfare for cutting trails and constructing roads immediately in rear of the front-line troops.

5. In jungle areas, artillery fire in close support of infantry troops must be conducted by forward observers rather than by map firing or control from the air. Initial ranges must be long and the range gradually reduced.

6. Troops must be impressed with the fact that it is frequently not easy to distinguish between friendly and enemy artillery fire. Before reporting friendly artillery fire falling on troops, this should be investigated by some officer competent to judge. Artillery observers should be consulted or report on this.

7. In jungles the infantry must stay close to tanks in order to provide necessary security. In open terrain they should not be close to the tank as they are endangered by fire directed against the tank.

8. Great care must be exercised by troops in rear areas not to fire on friendly units forward of their location. All troops must provide their own perimeter defense.

9. The unnecessary exposure of leaders at the front cannot be too strongly discouraged. Leaders must learn to direct their units without using signals which can be observed by an alert enemy and must not carry openly equipment which is indicative of their position as leaders. Too much bravado by leaders with a view to heartening their troops soon becomes ineffective.

10. Tree-burst artillery and mortar fire is an effective countermeasure for enemy snipers in trees.

#### H - ENGINEERS

1. Engineer troops should work and fight entirely under the supervision of their own officers.

2. The initial attachment of engineer platoons to BLTs for amphibious operations is sound. However, all platoons should revert to control of their company commanders as soon as regimental control is established. Companies should revert to battalion control as soon as Division control is established.

3. When engineers are used on special assault missions and construction in forward areas, infantry protection and fire support is essential since engineer fire power is inadequate.

4. More use should be made of booby traps to guard footpaths, trails, and roads that the enemy may use.

5. Too much reliance is placed on construction of roads by engineer troops. All combat elements should assist by continually improving footpaths, trails and secondary roads.

6.. Precautions must be taken against enemy mines, even though they are used sparingly. Route reconnaissance must be made before moving any heavy equipment.

#### I - SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS

1. Close coordination is necessary between the landing force and the photographic reconnaissance unit in order that a planned coverage may be secured. In this operation, pictures too frequently did not cover the areas in which ground troops were most vitally interested.
2. Briefing of Underwater Demolition Teams by Army intelligence officers just prior to an operation will materially increase the amount of information of value that these teams will bring back.

#### J - MEDICAL

1. The 1/4 T truck was satisfactory as an ambulance. The M29C was unsatisfactory in the terrain peculiar to these islands as it subjected casualties to an unusual amount of jolting.
2. An adequate supply of coffee and apparatus for the preparation of hot coffee for casualties must be available for use in medical installations as far forward as practicable, to include the battalion aid station when possible.
3. Strict control must be exercised to safeguard and divert for use of patients only, any special food or other supplies coveted by personnel not patients.
4. Salt tablets should be made an item of medical supply and the bulk of this supply carried in its resupply. This will insure prompt delivery to troops.

#### K - PUBLIC RELATIONS

1. The morale factor of adequate and correct publicity is very important. Troops react favorably to communique or press accounts that lend importance to the contribution of their Division, Regiment, or Company to the results of the battle. All concerned should be careful to give credit where it is due.

#### L - COMMUNICATIONS

1. Signal plans, SOPs, and SOIs should be furnished Division Headquarters by higher headquarters at least two weeks prior to embarkation to allow time for the preparation of necessary extracts and dissemination to all echelons of command.
2. The Division Msg Cen and Radio Officers should contact the Flag

Communication Officer at least one week prior to departure to discuss local problems not covered by Combined Communications Board Publications and establish a common procedure.

3. The first few phrases of each cryptographed message should be decrypted by the originator to ascertain that encryption is correct.
4. Call signs for net calls should be provided by higher headquarters.
5. It is advisable to divide the Division Command Net on two frequencies: Command Net A to serve DHQ, the combat teams and Div Arty, and Command Net B to serve all other units requiring radio communication with the Division.
6. SCR 193's should be installed in 3/4-T WC, and tables and one MC-88 provided with each set. One MC-88 should replace the portable typewriter in the SCR 399; one CP tent should be provided the Radio Section for night operations by remote control.
7. RCTs should be issued SCR 193's with three tuning units affording a range of 1.5-6.0 mc.
8. Arrangements should be made for obtaining gasoline while aboard ship for the PE 95, since the motor must be run to keep the commutator from corroding.
9. Some improvement must be made in the construction of the antenna for the SCR 300. An excessive number were broken.
10. All circuits must be tagged at least at every other tie and preferably at every tie. Marking tags by punching holes facilitates identification in the dark and eliminates the possibility of pencil markings being washed out by rain and faded by the sun.
11. High priority in debarkation should be given wire teams; at least one per RCT and one spare team for miscellaneous circuits should be landed with the advance echelon of Division Headquarters.
12. Close coordination with JAS Co facilitates the early establishment of wire communications to major units.
13. Sufficient personnel must be placed ashore prior to the unloading of signal equipment to sort and store it properly.

#### M - EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES

1. A division operating independently should have attached to it an ammunition company, a bakery platoon, a clothing and shoe repair platoon, a Quartermaster salvage platoon, and a Quartermaster laundry platoon.

2. Conservation of supplies requires thorough indoctrination of the troops for its necessity and adequate salvage operation.

a. Loss of individual equipment can be minimized by withholding from issue to certain individuals items they will not require, even though listed in T/E. Unit commanders must collect and guard this surplus equipment until it can be collected by salvage details.

b. Infantry regiments should have salvage teams to insure rapid evacuation of enemy material and permit collection of our own discarded equipment and supplies. Division salvage teams should likewise begin operation early in the rear areas. It is most important to salvage items that the enemy will utilize, such as weapons, ammunition, food, and water containers.

3. Motor Vehicles:

a. Number and types used in operation are listed in Incl No. 1.

b. Organic engineer combat battalion:

- (1) One  $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton truck should be taken by each platoon.
- (2) Five  $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton dump trucks for each lettered company and three per headquarters and service company are adequate except for operations on larger land masses.
- (3) One  $1\frac{1}{2}$ -ton truck with 1-ton trailer for water purification unit should be used instead of  $3\frac{1}{4}$ -ton weapons carrier.
- (4) Full T/E allowance of air compressors is recommended.
- (5) DUKWs are important for initial supply of engineer platoons.

c. Amphibious tractor battalion:

- (1) One trailer for spare parts is essential.
- (2) Growsers on LVT tracks should be redesigned for greater strength.

d. Tank Battalion:

- (1) One medium tank per company should be equipped with bulldozer blade.

e. Joint Assault Signal:

- (1) Twenty-one  $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trailers are needed, to carry equipment initially.

f. Antiaircraft battalion:

- (1) One bulldozer not smaller than D-6 per battery and one track laying prime mover per battery are essential. This will permit reduction in number of other trucks.

g. Amphibious Truck Company:

- (1) Should be self-sufficient as far as maintenance is concerned.
- (2) One  $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton truck should be allotted each platoon.

h. Division Artillery: In an operation involving more extensive terrain the following additional transportation should be provided:

- (1) Two  $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trucks to Headquarters Battery.
- (2) One 3/4 ton truck per firing battery.
- (3) Six additional M-5 tractor prime movers for 155mm How. battalion. Light and heavy bulldozers were of great value throughout the operation.

i. Division Quartermaster Company: One platoon of 16 trucks is a minimum.

j. Special Type: The M29C was unsatisfactory due to the rough terrain encountered. Transmission of this vehicle should be strengthened and enlarged for greater oil capacity. Moreover, it was prone to throw its tracks, requiring a minimum of one-half hour to replace. The number of M29C's carried was excessive for this operation. More  $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trucks should have been substituted.

#### 4. Equipment:

##### a. Engineer:

- (1) The armored D-8 tractor should be semi-permanently modified with light armor plate prior to loading so as to give adequate protection to the engineer.
- (2) One T-9 Crawler Crane per battalion is adequate and essential.
- (3) A minimum of 5 pole trailers per battalion is needed for extended operations.
- (4) One odograph per battalion is adequate and essential.
- (5) The 2500 and 5000 GPD distillation units, skid-mounted, are too bulky. The present 2500 GPD unit gives unsatisfactory performance. There is definite need for a fool-proof 2500 GPD unit, mounted on trailer.
- (6) The organic battalion has need of four D-8s per line company and three D-8s for H&S Co.
- (7) Each shore party battalion has need of the following in any operation:
  - 4 D-7 Caterpillar tractors with blades.
  - 2 D-6 Caterpillar tractors with blades.
  - 1 D-8 Caterpillar tractor with blade.
  - 1 Crane, quickway type truck mounted.
  - 1 Crane, crawler mounted, capacity 5 tons.
  - 2 Cranes, Type M-5.
  - 5 Dump trucks plus light and special vehicles.
- (8) Cyclone wire should be used in place of Summerfield matting which proved to be unsatisfactory.

##### b. Medical:

- (1) Each Clearing platoon should be given the same equipment, particularly when RCTs are separated by great

distances. The lack of X-Ray and washing machines in one platoon was a serious handicap.

- (2) The reserve supply for a division should contain a large supply of litters, cots, and blankets.
- (3) Half the supply of insect control equipment should be distributed to RCTs and Sp Trs, the remainder kept in division supply.

c. Chemical Warfare:

- (1) Infantry troops should organize their own facilities for servicing and maintaining the flamethrower, to relieve engineers for engineering tasks.

d. Ordnance:

- (1) The 20 days' maintenance spare parts for the amphibian truck company should be increased to include more propeller shafts, brake cylinders, and seals for drive shaft. Individual platoons should carry more spare parts to be self sufficient.
- (2) The tank battalion needs two spare instrument panels and two sets of wiring complete.
- (3) Lifting eyes or hooks should be placed on all vehicles and gun or howitzer carriages at time of manufacture to facilitate loading and unloading from ships.
- (4) Trailers, water, 250 gal, should be placed on T/E for the Infantry Division on the basis of 1 per battalion.

e. Signal:

- (1) The SCR 610 is too heavy to be hand carried and should be replaced with a lighter type set.
- (2) One SCR 625 Metallic Mine Detector per engineer platoon is adequate.
- (3) Three SCR 509-10 should be added to the amphibian tractor battalion if it is to be employed on two separated beaches. Contact can be maintained between maintenance LST, control boat, and beach party.

5. Weapons: See Incl No. 4 for allocations made over and above T/E.

a. Types:

- (1) Gun, submachine, Cal. .45, M3 should be issued as follows:

One to each engineer and infantry rifle squad and 5 to each artillery firing battery to replace similar number of carbines and rifles. All drivers and operators of heavy equipment should have them.

- (2) Rifle, BAR, Cal. .30 M1918A2: Each engineer platoon should have 3.
- (3) Gun, machine, Cal. .50, H.B. Flexible: Where air superiority exists, and AA units provide protection, automatic rifles, shotguns, and submachine guns are more satisfactory.
- (4) Howitzer 75mm Pack M1A1 and Gun 37mm, T-32: Very valuable in extremely rough terrain and mountain and cave warfare to eliminate centers of final enemy resistance.

## 6. Supplies:

### a. Rations:

- (1) Each clearing platoon or similar installation should carry a minimum of 2 tons of convalescent rations to include a proper ratio of soups, fruit juices, and bouillon; the field hospital 5 tons; and the division medical supply 5 tons as reserve.
- (2) Coffee should be provided on the following basis:  
One 20 lb tin to each battalion aid station and collecting platoon, four 20 lb tins to each clearing platoon or similar installation, twenty 20 lb tins to the field hospital, twenty 20 lb tins to the division medical supply as reserve.

### b. Ammunition:

- (1) Infantry:
  - (a) The issue of the M-9 launcher, pyrotechnic, hand, and ammunition therefor should be discontinued, and an increase made in the issue of Al series of aircraft signals which fit rifle and carbine grenade launchers.
  - (b) The U/F for the Grenade, rifle, fragmentation, should be 6 per grenade launcher; if unavailable, adapters should be furnished for 30% of the hand fragmentation grenades issued.
  - (c) To be effective shotgun shells must be made of metal casing. Cardboard casing failed to withstand the effect of wet weather with the result that shotguns could be used only as single shot weapons.
  - (d) The CINCPOA U/F for the 60mm mortar should be changed from 100 rds (90 shell, HE, M49A2; 10 shell, illum. M83) to 120 rounds (85 shell, HE, M49A2; 35 shell, illum, M83).
  - (e) The CINCPOA U/F for the 81mm mortar should be changed to provide for 60 HE, light, 25 WP and 15 HE, heavy. This would not increase the U/F, but change the ratio.

- (f) Cannister type ammunition for the 57mm AT gun should be developed.
- (2) Artillery:
  - (a) The proportion of green bag powder for 155mm howitzers is too small for a landing operation where ranges will always be relatively short for the first few days. Fifty per cent of the powder should be green bag; the remainder of the new white bag type which permits the use of Charge III.
  - (b) There is an urgent need for an artillery star shell for night illumination. It should preferably be of 105mm caliber, and similar to the Navy 5" star shell.
  - (c) The artillery ammunition supply proved to be slightly in excess of the requirements, solely because of the small size of the island attacked. It is believed that for operations of this general character, 7 U/F of 105mm Howitzer and 5 U/F of 155mm Howitzer should be the minimum carried with the troops. A special allotment of smoke shell should be provided in addition to the small percentage contained in a normal U/F.
- (3) Chemical Mortar:
  - (a) The CINCPAO U/F for the 4.2" chemical mortar should be increased from 60 rounds to 100 rounds. (60% HE and 40% WP).
  - (b) The 4.2" chemical mortar company should be furnished a minimum of 7200 rounds of ammunition.
- (4) Tanks:
  - (a) The U/F for tanks should be changed to 30% APC, 60% HE, 10% smoke.
  - (b) APC used in place of HE is much less effective than desired.

c. Class II:

- (1) Supplies of clothing and equipment landed were adequate for emergency combat replacement only and strict control had to be exercised in their issuance.
- (2) The basis of issue of impregnated clothing should be reduced to equip only a decontamination squad of ten men for each company, battery, or troop.
- (3) Amphibian tanks and DUKWs should be furnished stove, cooking, gasoline, one burner, instead of the field range.
- (4) 12 additional pumps, gasoline, dispensing, portable, should be added to the T/E of the amphibian tractor battalion.
- (5) Canvas paulins and storage tent authorized as additional T/E tentage proved invaluable for emergency

use as initial shelter for supplies and equipment.

d. Class IV:

- (1) Explosives and Demolition Accessories:
  - (a) The total quantity of explosives was sufficient for the operation, but would not have been had the second phase been carried out.
  - (b) The number of booby trap devices could be reduced and the amount of primacord and 15 second delay detonators increased. The 15 second delay detonator has proved to be the most dependable and safest means for detonation in assault work.
  - (c) There was no call for cratering charges or TNT since the block demolitions, M-1 and M-3, proved to be most practicable.
  - (d) The M-2 and T-3 shaped charges proved very valuable against emplacements.
  - (e) Bangalore kits, AT mines, and land snakes were not used, but the quantities carried were not excessive for normal operations.
- (2) Fortifications:
  - (a) In certain areas it was impossible to dig in; consequently, the supply of sand bags proved inadequate.
  - (b) The supply of materials for wire obstacles was adequate. For providing adequate and rapid protection, a standard concertina should be issued by the engineer supply agencies, so that defensive wire can be quickly erected.
- (3) Construction Material:
  - (a) Practically all of the construction materials arrived in good condition, except the latrine boxes and fly traps. These essential items should be shipped knocked down, securely packed, and marked. Precautions must be taken to prevent misappropriation and careless handling.

Incl No. 1 - Vehicles taken by units.

Incl No. 2 - Combat and Engineer Equipment Taken by Units.

Incl No. 3 - Towed Weapons.

Incl No. 4 - Armament in Excess of T/E taken by Units.

Inclosure Number 1 - Vehicles Taken by Units.


VEHICLES	Car. Mtr. M-8
321st Infantry	6 6 16 4
322nd Infantry	6 6 16 4
323rd Infantry	6 6 16 4
Hq Btry Div Arty	3 1 1 4
316 FA Bn	2 1 1 4
317 FA Bn	2 1 1 3
906 FA Bn	2 1 1 4
318 FA Bn	
306 Engr Bn	3 10 6 2
306 Med Bn	12 8 1 5
81st Sig Co	9 1 8 3
81st QM Co	
781st Ord Co	
Hq Company	1 1 10 2
81st Rec Tr	2 4 1 14
81st MP Plat	
Co D 88 Cml Bn	1 2 6 1
Bomb Disp. Squad	
Graves Reg. Det	1

Inclosure Number 1 (Cont'd)

VEHICLES (CONT'D)									
Hq & Hq Co. Engr Gp									Carr. Mtr. M-8
52nd Engr Bn									Carr. M-29-C
154th Engr Bn									Cart Hand M3A4
155th Engr Bn									DUKW
710th Tank Bn									Half-Track
726 Amph Trac. Bn									Tractor M-5
483 MA Bn									Trailer Athey
592nd JASCO									Trailer 1/4 T
Co D 776th Amph Tank									Trailer 1-Ton
481st Amph Trk. Co.									Trailer, water 250 Gal
50									Truck 1/4 Ton
1									Truck 3/4 Ton
1									Truck 1 1/2 Ton
1									Truck 2 1/2 Ton
1									Truck 2 1/2 Dump
1									Truck 2 1/2 Ton Mach Shop
1									Truck 2 1/2 Ton Small Arm Rep.
1									Truck 4 T Wrecker
1									Truck 10T Wrecker


Inclosure Number 2 - Combat and Engineer Equipment  
Taken by units.

COMBAT & ENGINEER VEHICLES & EQUIPMENT											
52nd Engr Bn											LVT 1A(4) Arm W/Arm
154th Engr Bn											LVT 2 Cargo Arm W/Arm
155th Engr Bn											LVT 4 Armored W/Arm
710th Tank Bn											LVT1A1(1) Combat (Arm)
726th Amph Trac En	17	54	39								Tank, Light M5A1
Co "D" 776th Amph Tank Bn	9		2	9							Tank, Med. M4
318th FA Bn											Tank, Med. M-10
306th Engr Bn											Truck, Air Compressor
Hq Co Engr Gp											Dozer R-4
											Dozer D-4
											Dozer D-6
											HD - 14
											Dozer D-8
											Crane M-5
											Crane T-9
											Crane M-20
											Tractor D-7
											Dist. Unit 5,000 GPD
											Dist. Unit 2,500 GPD




Inclosure Number 3 - Towed Weapons Taken by Units

TOWED WEAPONS		
316th FA En		37MM AT Gun
317th FA En		37MM Pack. T32
906th FA En		57MM Gun
318th FA En		4.2 Cml Mortar
321st Inf	9	75mm Pack How.
322nd Inf	9	105MM How
323rd Inf	9	155MM How
483rd AAA	4	M51 Mult. MG
Co. "D" 88th Chem Bn	12	Gun AA 40MM
Hq Co. 81st Div		
781st Ordnance	2*	
*Reserve	3	



Inclosure Number 4

Armament in Excess of  
T/E Taken by Units.



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CO 710th Tank Bn .....	1
CO 726th Amph Tractor Bn .....	1
CO 17th Field Hosp .....	1
CO 592d JAS Co .....	1
CO 41st Port Surg Hosp .....	1
CO 481st Amph Truck Co .....	1
CO Co D, 88th Cml Wpns Bn .....	1
CO Co D, 726th Amph Tank Bn .....	1
File .....	1

